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RISK-BASED CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES: A




Most commentators agree that the current capital adequacy guide-
lines are flawed.' Yet, the belief that prudent bank supervision de-
mands some form of capital requirements prevails.2 Accordingly, the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation continue to expand and refine
their capital adequacy guidelines ("CAGs"). 3
1. See James R. Barth et al., The Future of American Banking 150 (1992);
Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation § 5.3.1. (1994); Henry N. Butler & J.
Brady Dugan, The Impact of Recent Banking Regulations on the Market for Corporate
Control, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 861, 872-75 (1990); Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding
Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 507, 586-96(1994);
Edward J. Kane, Taxpayer Loss Exposure in the Bank Insurance Fund, in Reforming
Financial Institutions and Markets in the United States 37, 39-43 (George G. Kauf-
man ed., 1994) (criticizing regulatory implementation of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Improvement Act of 1991's mandate to incorporate interest rate risks in risk
based CAGs); Joseph J. Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regula-
tory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 Ohio St. LJ. 1299,
1360-63 (1989); Stuart D. Root, Three Cs of Bank Capital: Convergence, Conun-
drums and Contrariness, 1994 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 135, 151-60 (1994).
2. See David Gowland, The Regulation of Financial Markets in the 1990s 64-68(1990); Wayne D. Angell, Bank Capita" Lessons From the Past and Thoughts for the
Future, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 603, 607-11 (1992); Richard C. Breeden, Thumbs on
the Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis,
59 Fordham L. Rev. S71, S75 (1991); Kenneth J. Gordon, Risk-Based Capital Require-
ments: The Proper Approach to Safe and Sound Banking?, 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L
491, 510-18 (1991); William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-
Based Capital Requirements, 49 Ohio St. L. 1365, 1379 (1989). For views that capital
does not play the traditional role of providing a last line of defense against loss, see
Jeremy F. Taylor, The Banking System in Troubled Tunes: New Issues of Stability
and Continuity 43 (1989).
3. CAGs are a set of regulations mandated by Congress and promulgated by the
regulators that require depository institutions to hold minimum amounts of capital in
relation to their risk-weighted assets. See discussion supra part I.B. This Note concen-
trates on the OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC as the "Regulators." The three organiza-
tions proposed the CAGs jointly and have, with few exceptions, maintained their
uniformity. The OCC's regulations most often will be referred to for the sake of
simplicity. The Office of Thrift Supervision has implemented risk-based CAGs pursu-
ant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.), which, while different in some respects, are based on the same principles
underlying the other banking agencies' CAGs. For a discussion of these risk-based
capital standards see Anthony C. Providenti Jr., Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not
Getting Burned. Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S323, S330-32 (1991); Stuart D.
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Through the 1980s and early 1990s, banks yielded to "financial fra-
gility," a deterioration of asset quantity, quality, and earnings.4 Banks
in the United States were in poor health. In the past two years, how-
ever, the economy has revitalized the banking industry. Banks posted
record earnings5 and the Bank Insurance Fund has been recapital-
ized.6 Regulators and commentators credit CAGs with this recovery,
but after five years of profoundly affecting bank asset portfolios, the
value of CAGs has yet to be tested, mostly because of the favorable
upswing in the economy most of the country experienced in the first
half of this decade. This Note examines the contributions of CAGs to
the current condition of the banking industry and their value as a cor-
nerstone of regulatory policy. Part I introduces the CAGs and pro-
vides some background on their evolution and intended purpose from
the regulators' perspective. Part II examines the effects of CAGs on
banks, depositors, and taxpayers. Part II also investigates the degree
to which these effects advance or undermine the regulators' objec-
tives. Part III considers the current CAGs and describes recent and
proposed developments. Part III also looks ahead to assess the value
of CAGs as an effective regulatory policy for the future of banking.
This Note concludes that CAGs do not guarantee bank soundness
and, in most instances, fall short of their stated objectives. The CAGs'
weaknesses outweigh their utility, and a better way to manage bank
risk is available. CAGs are fundamentally defective for a number of
reasons. The banking system and credit availability will suffer when
poor economic conditions combine with a regulatory environment
that does not allow banks to compete effectively. Nevertheless, since
the economy has been growing for the past two to three years, banks
have not experienced the problems capital guidelines pose when the
economy is in recession. Also, capital requirements that are supposed
to stabilize the banking system may ultimately change banking sub-
stantially. The consolidation and shrinkage occurring in United States
banking is a product of the regulatory environment epitomized by the
CAGs.
The survival of banking will depend on regulators shifting their nar-
row focus away from a system of prudential regulation and micro
management toward a broad perspective that emphasizes reforming
the method and structure of banking regulation.
Root, Bank Capital, Asset Liquidation, and the Credit Crunch, 1993 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 169, 177-82 (1993).
4. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Banks Under
Stress 10 (1992).
5. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
6. As of June 30, 1994, the Bank Insurance Fund balance was $17.5 billion, near
the all time high mark of $18.3 billion. Bank Insurance Fund Increased to $1Z5 Billion




Capital's role in controlling corporate and bank activity has devel-
oped since the origination of those institutions. A brief deviation into
the evolution of capital requirements and the sources of the current
CAGs is necessary in order to understand the regulators' justifications
for CAGs as well as the criticisms of the CAGs that will follow.
A. The History of Capital Requirements for Banks
Regulating capital is a common device for defining an institution's
ability to meet its obligations. For example, corporate law often re-
stricts the dividends a corporation may distribute based on the corpo-
ration's capital position.7 This use of capital, known as "legal capital"'
or "stated capital," however, has lost its usefulness as a protector and
indicator of corporate health.9 Originally, legal capital signified an ab-
solute minimum amount of resources creditors could rely on'0 and
was a factor creditors could use in deciding whether, or on what terms,
to extend credit." This measure of shareholder commitment was a
useful tool as corporate law developed in the latter nineteenth cen-
tury. Modem corporate practices, however, have rendered legal capi-
tal obsolete as a measure for corporate risk taking.12
Most banks are corporations, 13 yet while private industry has
largely done away with minimal capital requirements, 4 banks, under
7. See Robert C. Clarke, Corporate Law § 14.3, at 611 (1986); Del. Code Ann. tit.
8, §§ 154, 170 & 173 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
8. Legal capital was ... regarded as the quid pro quo for granting limited
liability to shareholders. Technically, 'legal capital' or 'stated capital' refers
to the sum of the 'par values' of all of the outstanding stock of a corporation,
or, if the corporation's stock is 'no par,' the 'stated capital' refers to an
amount that the directors decide to attribute to all the outstanding stock.
Clarke, supra note 7, § 14.3, at 611.
9. Id. § 14.3, at 611-12.
10. Id. § 14.3, at 611.
11. Id. § 17.1.2, at 708.
12. The whole concept of capital is itself an anachronism. In the words of
Manning, legal capital is 'a) a number expressed in dollars, b) initially the
product of par value, c) on the right hand... side of the balance sheet, d)
that can at best be read to convey a message ... about an historical event
.... ' and has no relation to the present economic condition of the enterprise.
William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporations 1437-38 (6th ed. unabridged
1988) (quoting B. Manning, Legal Capital 21 (2d ed. 1981) (citation omitted) (empha-
sis omitted); see generally id. at 1416-1440 (discussing introduction of no-par stock,
which was first authorized in New York in 1912, as well as the problems of watered
and discount shares and the difficulty of determining the value of property and serv-
ices received in consideration for stock).
13. National banking associations must be organized as corporations. 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1988).
14. Most states have abandoned statutory minimum capital requirements. William
P. Hackney & Tracey R. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U.
Pitt. L. Rev., 837, 852, 897-98 (1982) (arguing, however, that to afford creditors some
protection, the law should require a capitalization standard that provides for a reason-
able business chance, but not a likelihood of success). The amount of capital contrib-
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the control of federal regulators, are subject to capital measures far
stricter than the "legal capital" statutes. This is understandable be-
cause unlike most corporations whose liabilities consist of equity and
bondholder debt, banks operate predominantly on deposits. Banks
are, therefore, more highly leveraged than most corporations because
they have a higher ratio of debt to equity.
Before the 1980s, regulators enforced capital requirements infor-
mally.1 5 Until World War II, the measure was a capital-to-deposits
ratio.' 6 For a time after the war, the Fed and the FDIC used a capital-
to-assets ratio.' 7 The Comptroller of Currency's bank rating system
considered capital in assessing a bank's health.' This system became
the interagency standard to evaluate the financial health of banks
under the direction of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, formed in 1979.' 9
In 1981, banking regulators responded to disintegrating capital posi-
tions by promulgating explicit capital standards.2 0 These standards
were inadequate because they did not account for the varying amount
of risk in bank portfolios.2' They required more capital than was nec-
essary for safe banks and not enough for unsafe banks. To customize
capital requirements to an individual bank's risk level, Congress
adopted the Capital Adequacy Guidelines that have contributed to
the microscopic regulation of the banking industry. 2
One of the rare successful judicial challenges to regulatory enforce-
ment of capital requirements came in 1983, when the Fifth Circuit
overturned the Comptroller's determination that a bank was unsafe
uted by the shareholders, however, may be a factor when a court considers whether to
pierce the corporate veil. See Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961).
15. Alan Gart, Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation: The Future of the Bank-
ing, Insurance, and Securities Industries 118-19 (1994).
16. Gordon, supra note 2, at 493.
17. IL A capital-to-deposits ratio requires a bank to hold capital in relation to the
total deposits of the bank. A capital-to-assets ratio demands the bank hold a percent-
age of capital measured against the bank's total assets.
18. This bank rating system, known by the acronym CAMEL, considers the fol-
lowing factors: capital adequacy, asset quality, management ability, earnings, and li-
quidity. CAMEL ratings determine how often a bank is examined by regulators. See
Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective Action
Decisions by the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 505, 531 n.138
(1993).
19. Alfred D. Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline:
The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. Corp. L. 139, 145
n.29 (1986).
20. See 46 Fed. Reg. 62,693 (1981) (stating the FDIC's policy on capital adequacy);
Kevin Jacques & Peter Nigro, How Did Banks React to the Risk-Based Capital Stan-
dards?, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency Q.J., Dec. 1994, at 11.
21. Jacques & Nigro, supra note 20, at 12; see H.R. Rep. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1928-29.
22. See Carl Horowitz, Keeping Banking System Healthy: Does Risk Based Insur-
ance Portend Privatization?, Investor's Bus. Daily, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al, A4.
2398 [Vol. 63
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and unsound based on poor capital structure.13 Congress quickly
stepped in and superseded the decision, enacting the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983. ILSA established the regulators'
authority and duty to utilize capital ratios.?6
Not until 1985 did regulators adopt common standards for defining
bank capital. 6 Historically, banks circumvented capital requirements
by holding high risk assets or off-balance sheet assets.27 In response
to such practices, federal regulators proposed risk-based CAGs in
1988 . 8
1. The Basle Agreement
The current guidelines are a product of the Basle Agreementz'
adopted by the G-10 countries3 ° in 1988. The CAGs were phased in
over a two year period. As of December 31, 1989, the fifty largest
United States banks had capital-to-total assets ratios of five percent.3'
All national banks had to comply with the risk-weighted CAGs by
23. See First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 684
(5th Cir. 1983).
24. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3901-3912 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
25. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of the extent
of the enforcement authority of the FDIC, see Thomas M.L. Metzger, FDIC Capital
Directive Procedures: The Unacceptable Risk of Bias, 110 Banking LJ. 237, 237-38
(1993) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 170 (1991), which held that the FDIC's
capital directive procedures are not subject to judicial review, is a violation of due
process rights). To illustrate the enforcement power of the CAGs, under ILSA, if a
regulator finds a bank is undercapitalized it "may be deemed [in] ... an unsafe and
unsound practice within the meaning of section 1818." 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). In addition to the remedies under § 1818, § 3907 gives the regulator
authority to issue a "capital directive." Id. § 3907(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The capital directive forces the bank to submit to a plan the regulator finds acceptable
"describing the means and timing by which the banking institution shall achieve its
required capital leveL" Id. § 3907(b)(2)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under
§ 1818(i) and Bank of Coushatta, the bank is not allowed judicial review of the regula-
tor's decision.
26. See Gart, supra note 15, at 119.
27. James L. Pierce, The Future of Banking 93 (1991). For a definition of off and
on-balance sheet items see infra notes 61-63, 90-91 and accompanying text. Before
risk-weighted CAGs, regulators only took into account assets that were recorded on a
bank's balance sheet. To avoid holding capital, banks would concentrate funds to off-
balance sheet items. For a discussion of how these are incorporated into the CAGs
see infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
28. 53 Fed. Reg. 8550 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.RI pts. 3, 225 & 325)
(proposing new risk-based capital guidelines).
29. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, re-
printed in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 5403, at 3309 (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter
Basle Agreement].
30. The G-10 countries are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Luxem-
bourg. Id. 5403, at 3309 n.1.
31. See United States Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial Sys-
tem: United States Treasury Department Recommendations for Safer, More Compet-
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December 31, 1990, but were required to hold only 7.25 percent of
capital.32 As of December 31, 1992, federal regulations required all
depository institutions to hold a minimum of eight percent of capital33
in relation to their risk-weighted assets.34
The Basle Agreement guidelines were principally designed to level
the playing field among international banks. They were established to
"strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system" and to diminish "competitive inequality among international
banks. ' 35 The Basle Guidelines were not specifically tailored to the
needs of the United States banking system or any particular national
banking system, rather, they were the product of a broad compromise
among nations. United States banking regulators implemented the
Basle Agreement guidelines with few differences among the agen-
cies. 36 The regulators issued three officially stated goals of the nation-
ally implemented CAGs: (1) to make capital requirements more
sensitive to the differences in risk profiles among banks; (2) to take
off-balance sheet items into account when assessing the amount of
capital a bank should hold; and (3) to minimize disincentives to hold-
ing fluid, low risk assets. 37 The guidelines may or may not achieve the
international goals; however, they do fall short of the stated national
agenda.
2. Statutory Mandate
Congress has granted regulators enormous power to create and im-
plement regulations to enforce CAGs.3 s The power granted to federal
itive Banks (Feb. 1991, reprinted in [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 88,367, at 97,359 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Treasury Modernization Study].
32. 12 C.F.R. § 3.7 (1994).
33. Regulators stress that eight percent is a minimum that "should not be viewed
as the level to be targeted, but rather as a floor." 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(b)(1)
(1994).
34. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 4(a)(1), at 28 (national banks); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208
app. A (IV)(A), at 242 (state member banks); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 app. A (IV)(A), at
176 (bank holding companies); 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. B (I), at 178 (insured nonmem-
ber banks); Basle Agreement, supra note 29, at 3315.
35. Basle Agreement, supra note 29, 1 5403, at 3309.
36. See generally Report to the Congress Regarding the Differences in Capital and
Accounting Standards Among the Federal Banking and Thrift Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg.
36,833. (July 19, 1994) (noting that the differences in application of risk weighted as-
sets occur mostly between the OTS and the other regulators) [hereinafter Capital
Standards].
37. 53 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8551 (1988).
38. Authority to impose CAGs derives from the International Lending Supervi-
sion Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 3901-12 (1988). Section 3907(a)(1) states: "Each appro-
priate Federal banking agency shall cause banking institutions to achieve and
maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking
institutions and by using such other methods as the appropriate Federal banking
agency deems appropriate." Section 3907(a)(2) states: "Each appropriate Federal
banking agency shall have the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for
a banking institution as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion,
2400 [Vol. 63
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regulators is evident from the effects of the redefinition of capital. 39
The concept of capital was fairly simple before regulators transformed
it into "regulatory capital. '40 Bank capital is no longer the difference
between assets and liabilities.' Now it is determined by an abstruse
formula designed to ensure a sufficient balance of stockholder and
debtholder funds against the loans and securities of a bank.4 2 Adher-
ence to this strict regulatory policy ensures that the financial liability
of owners increases in proportion to the risks they take with deposi-
tors' money.
CAGs have become a foundation of regulatory policy,43 and Con-
gress continues to direct that the regulators use capital as the basis for
many of the decisions they make concerning banks." Congress' origi-
nal mandate came with ILSA in 1983 and was reinforced by the Fman-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.41
deems to be necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the
banking institution."
The OCC's regulations, implemented pursuant to this congressional mandate, are
promulgated at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 and apply to national banks; the Fed's regulations are
promulgated at 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 and apply to state member banks; and bank holding
companies' regulations are promulgated at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225. The FDIC's regulations
are promulgated at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 and apply to FDIC insured state charted banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The CAGs have been most
recently modified by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FDICIA]. For more discussion of enforcement
powers under ILSA, see supra note 25.
39. The most obvious effect has been a shift in the assets banks hold. See infra part
II.B.3. Part II of this Note will also discuss other consequences of the CAGs such as
their affect on credit availability and bank safety.
40. Capital has different meanings for different people: there is accounting capital
(capital as net worth, the difference between assets and liabilities on a balance sheet),
market capital (the value of the company to the shareholders), and capital as a legal
concept (money or property owners may invest as equity, not as loans). For a discus-
sion of these definitions of capital and more, see Norton, supra note 1, at 1302-06.
41. Donald J. Tourney, Bank Regulation, Bank Accounting and Bank Failures,
1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 823, 825-30 (1992).
42. See id. at 830-38.
43. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. The regulatory policy is fairly sim-
ple. From the OCC view point, it includes "maintaining the safety and soundness of
the banking industry as a whole, providing support for the industry's efforts to pro-
vide credit and other financial services to its communities, and maintaining and en-
hancing a risk-focused, differential and proactive approach to the supervision of
national banks." 59 Fed. Reg. 57,168, 57,170 (1994) (unified agenda outlining the
Treasury Department's regulatory plan for the 1995).
44. Capital adequacy is mentioned in many sections of the federal regulations per-
taining to depository institutions. Examples are 12 C.F.R. § 5.0 (organization of a
national bank); 12 C.F.R. § 5.5 (change in bank control); 12 C.F.R. pt. 6 (prompt
corrective action); 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (investments and activities); 12 C.F.R. § 225.22
(nonbanking activities).
45. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) [hereinafter FIRREA]. FIRREA "mandated severe penalties for failure to
satisfy capital standards on a timely basis. More recently, FDICIA imposed a far-
reaching system of 'by the numbers' capital-based supervision, including mandatory
1995] 2401
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In 1991, Congress reiterated the CAGs' goals-to strengthen and
maintain the safety of the banking system-by enacting the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.46 Driven
by these powerful Congressional mandates, regulators continually
modify CAG regulations to account for more of the elements of risk
involved in banking operations.
3. CAGs as a Reaction to Deregulation
Banking, a very profitable industry, started to become much less
profitable when nonbank firms, realizing the profits to be made from
depositors' money, started offering individual and corporate investors
higher rates of return on time deposits than banks could offer.47 This
resulted in substantial decreases in the market share and asset quality
of banks.' Congress and the regulators implemented deregulation in
response to the problems caused by nonbank competition. In addition
to hastening disintermediation,49 traditional regulation caused too
much regulatory inefficiency that hampered innovation and increased
operating costs. 50 Congress relaxed regulation to allow banks to com-
pete freely with other financial institutions that were offering bank
depositors more lucrative places to store their money.51 Deregulation
closure of still-solvent banking institutions that fall below certain capital thresholds."
John P. Danforth, Who Pays for the High Cost of Excessive Bank Regulation?, 12 No.
9 Banking Pol'y Rep. 1, 3 (1993). Along with these new enforcement powers has
come a change in the relationship between regulators and banks. Under FIRREA,
Congress "ordered the banking agencies to use these powers 'aggressively.'" Baxter,
supra note 18, at 509. Under FDICIA, "Congress forced the agencies to take early
and decisive action against troubled banking institutions, their owners, directors, and
employees." Id.
46. See FDICIA, supra note 38, §§ 131 & 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831p-1 (Supp. V 1993).
47. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Reg-
ulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 501, 521-29 (1989) [hereinafter
Garten, Growing Pains]. Four reasons are suggested for the new competition to
banks: (1) regulators prevented banks from paying depositors as much as nonbank
firms could pay due to the Banking Act of 1933, which (a) prevented banks from
paying interest on demand deposits and (b) allowed the Fed to set maximum interest
rates on time deposits; (2) the development of financial instruments allowed individu-
als to tap directly into the capital market; (3) technical innovation allowed rapid
movement of money; and (4) businesses of all sizes had improved money manage-
ment skills. See id. at 522.
48. Id. at 523-24.
49. Intermediation is when A bank transfers funds from a lender to a borrower and
acts as an intermediary facilitating the movement of funds. Banking Terminology 193
(3d ed. 1989). Disintermediation is the removal of funds from this system and can
ostensibly occur for a number of reasons, but, at bottom, is caused by the prohibitive
cost and inefficiency of intermediation. See id. at 118.
50. Garten, Growing Pains, supra note 47, at 525.
51. One way in which banking was deregulated was that the limits on the amount
of interest banks could pay on time deposits was removed. Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988); Lawrence
J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S57, S64-65 (1991).
2402 [Vol. 63
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promised to shape more efficient banks and thus a more stable bank-
ing system. 2 Unfortunately, deregulation was no panacea. Commen-
tators identified deregulation as one of the primary factors that led to
the failure of many banks and saving and loan associations in the
1980s.51 Banks and S&Ls had no incentive to put their own capital at
stake, and when they developed liquidity problems, they responded by
making riskier loans in the hope of producing cash flow to cover their
impending insolvency.54 This worsened their financial difficulties
considerably.55
Regulators reacted to the failures of the past decade by increasing
prudential regulation. 6 In a conservative reaction to deregulation,
Congress and the regulators have returned to a traditional yet more
sophisticated approach to maintaining the safety and soundness of the
banking system by relying primarily on risk-weighted capital adequacy
guidelines. These CAGs are "the single most important regulatory re-
sponse to the breakdown of the credit system."g
B. How the Current CAGs Work
CAGs differ from other regulations in that they are rigidly quantita-
tive.58 Their purpose is to "tailor an institution's minimum capital re-
quirement to broad categories of credit risk embodied in its assets and
52. Robert J. Laughlin, Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S301, S310-14 (1991).
53. See, eg., White, supra note 51, at S63-66 (describing how deregulation led to
the collapse of the savings and loan industry).
54. See id at S65-66.
55. Id
56. Prudential regulation is distinguished from prophylactic regulation. The latter
is associated with traditional regulation in that it creates "a series of barriers or
prohibitions, designed to control entry into banking and to channel banks and thrifts
into certain activities." Baxter, supra note 18, at 511. Prudential regulation is associ-
ated with safety and soundness measures. It was typically enforced informally
through "discussion, persuasion, and other non-adversarial methods for deterring ...
imprudent activities." Id. at 512. Since deregulation, prudential regulation has taken
the forefront over traditional regulation and has assumed a more formal character.
See id at 514. CAGs are an example of this shift in regulatory method.
57. Lowell L. Bryan, Breaking Up the Bank: Rethinking an Industry Under Siege
58 (1988).
58. Many aspects of a bank's performance, such as capital, assets, earnings, and
liquidity, are quantitative. Much regulation, however, deals with qualitative charac-
teristics such as management experience, character and general fitness, and the con-
venience and needs of a community. Regulations also attempt to quantify
characteristics that are very difficult to measure accurately such as risk assessments.
A complaint about quantitative regulation is that it is "substantially incomplete, mis-
leading, and short-sighted. Accepting it as a decision guide is to misunderstand bank-
ing fundamentals by neglecting banking's underlying foundation as a service
business." Bruce W. Morgan, Comment: Camel Ratings Ignore Relationships, The
Bedrock That Banks Are Built On, Am. Banker, June 27, 1994, at 15.
1995] 2403
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
off-balance sheet instruments."59 They do have a prudential element
as well. Regulators use a set of qualitative standards to determine the
capital a bank must hold above the eight percent minimum.60
The quantity and quality of a bank's assets will determine the
amount of capital a bank must hold. The minimum amount of capital
a bank must have is greater or equal to eight percent of its risk-
weighted assets. Therefore, it makes sense to identify assets first. Un-
fortunately, determining a bank's assets is not simply a matter of ad-
ding up the value of a bank's loans, securities, and cash.
1. Assets
CAG classifications identify and segregate assets based on whether
they are "on-balance sheet items" or "off-balance sheet items."'6' On-
balance sheet items include traditional assets such as loans and securi-
ties. Off-balance sheet items are lines of credit, guarantees, or credit
exposures6 of the bank that are not normally recorded as current as-
sets on a balance sheet. Regulators take particular interest in ac-
counting for and measuring the risk of off-balance sheet items because
they can expose banks to significant interest rate and foreign ex-
change rate risk.63
59. 59 Fed. Reg. 8421 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225 & 325)(proposed Feb. 22, 1994) (concerning concentration of credit risk and risks of non-
traditional activities).
60. Factors considered may include:
(a) [t]he conditions or circumstances leading to the Office's determination
that higher minimum capital ratios are appropriate or necessary for the
bank; (b) [t]he exigency of those circumstances or potential problems; (c)[t]he overall condition, management strength, and future prospects of the
bank... ; (d) [t]he bank's liquidity, capital, risk asset and other ratios com-
pared to the ratios of its peer group; and (e) [t]he views of the bank's direc-
tors and senior management.
12 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1994).
61. On-balance sheet items are simply items that bank accountants would record
in the bank accounts according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles such as
cash, securities, and loans. Off-balance sheet items consist of credit available to a
customer that is not currently being used but may be at a future time. Off-balance
sheet items may also be commitments for which there is no GAAP standard. Exam-
ples of off-balance sheet items are commercial and standby letters of credit, banker's
acceptances, options, forwards, and swaps. Banking Terminology 249 (3d ed. 1989).
62. Normally, credit exposures are recorded on the right hand side of a balance
sheet. They increase the balance of a liability or decrease the balance of an asset.
The credit exposure of an off-balance sheet item is usually not recorded because it is
not feasible or reliable. The reliability of the accounting process is very important to
both shareholders and corporate management because the financial statements influ-
ence their decisions. See Charles T. Horngren et al., Financial Accounting 9 (5th ed.
1993).
63. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 45,243 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (pro-
posed Sept. 1, 1994) (proposing OCC rules concerning calculation of credit equivalent
amounts of off-balance sheet contracts).
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a. On-balance Sheet Items
There are four risk categories for on-balance sheet items: zero per-
cent (riskless: banks do not need a dime of capital to protect these
assets), twenty percent (a little bit of risk, but not too much), fifty
percent (riskier), and one hundred percent (demands at least the full
eight percent of capital backing it up). At first glance, four categories
do not seem excessively elaborate, but after examining the compo-
nents of each category, the complexity of on-balance sheet assets will
become apparent. An explanation of each category follows.
i. Zero Percent Category
The zero percent category consists of the most fungible and
creditworthy assets. The first elements in this category constitute the
foundation of the United States banking system and include cash,'
gold, deposit reserves at Federal Reserve banks,65 and the book value
of Federal Reserve stock.66 In addition, this category includes uncon-
ditionally guaranteed claims against the United States government,67
its agencies,68 or the central government 69 of an OECD country,70 as
64. Cash entails foreign and domestic currency owned and held by the bank. 12
C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § (a)(1)(i) at 24 (1994).
65. The Fed requires all depository institutions to hold funds in noninterest bear-
ing accounts with the appropriate district reserve bank. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
66. Member banks of the Federal Reserve system must buy stock in their local
district federal reserve bank. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1988) (concerning national banks), 12
U.S.C. § 321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (concerning state banks).
67. Treasury Bills are the prime example, but more broadly this category includes
securities, leases, and loans in the form of debt obligations. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A
(U)(C) at 168 (1994).
68. Here, United States agency means an agency whose obligations are fully guar-
anteed by the full faith and credit of the United States government; these include the
Government National Mortgage Association, the Veterans Administration, the Fed-
eral Housing Administration, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporations, the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Small Business
Administration. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A, at 235 n27 (1994). This does not in-
clude privately issued mortgage backed securities issued by GNMA, FNMA, and
FHLMC. Such securities are given a 20% risk weight. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A
(H)(C) at 169 & n.23 (1994).
69. Central government includes the departments, ministries, and agencies of the
central government, and the central bank. The United States Central Bank includes
the 12 Federal Reserve Banks, but does not include state, provincial or local govern-
ments or commercial enterprises owned by the central government. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3
app. A § 1(c)(5) at 20 (1994).
70. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (II)(B) at 167 n.12 (1994). In May
1994, Mexico was accepted in the OECD and Saudi Arabia has a special lending ar-
rangement. See 59 Fed. Reg. 52,100 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, & 225)
(proposed Oct. 14, 1994) (concerning the loss of OECD status with regard to CAGs if
a country restructures its debt).
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well as unconditionally guaranteed claims on non-OECD govern-
ments.71 The last element of the zero percent category is claims col-
lateralized by cash on deposit or by securities issued by the United
States government, its agencies, or the central government of an
OECD country for which a positive margin of collateral is maintained
daily.72
Assigning these items a zero percent risk weight indicates that regu-
lators consider these assets virtually riskless. They are all very liquid,
and because the full taxing power of the United States and other eco-
nomically stable central governments guarantees their payment, it is
assumed they are risk free.7'
ii. Twenty Percent Category
The twenty percent category contains assets that have elements of
risk, but the risk is low because the asset is either collateralized or
conditionally guaranteed by a secure institution such as a federal
agency. Specifically, this category includes assets collateralized by
United States government or agency debt,74 or by the central govern-
ment of an OECD country;75 assets conditionally guaranteed 7 by the
United States Government, its agencies, or an OECD government;
71. Claims of governments other than OECD governments are unconditionally
guaranteed provided that such claims are funded in local currency by local liabilities.
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(1)(v) at 24 (1994).
72. This collateral requirement, until recently, did not apply to national banks, but
applied only to state member banks and bank holding companies. Report to Congres-
sional Committees Regarding Differences in Capital and Accounting Standards
Among the Federal Banking and Thrift Agencies, 60 Fed. Reg. 3227, 3230 (1995); 59
Fed. Reg. 66,642 (1994) (discussing OCC's final rule lowering the risk weight of collat-
eralized transactions that became effective Dec. 31, 1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 3). It still does not apply to state nonmember insured banks that are supervised by
the FDIC. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (II)(C)(1) & (2) at 168-69 (1994) (addressing 0%
and 20% categories for FDIC regulated banks). In December 1994 the OCC lowered
its risk weight category from 20% to 0% for collateralized transactions that pose mini-
mal credit or operational risk. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,642 (1994). The collateral must be a
positive margin of cash or OECD government securities that are controlled by the
bank. Id at 66,642.
73. 53 Fed. Reg. 8550 (1988).
74. The only forms of collateral recognized are: cash on deposit in the bank, se-
curities issued or guaranteed by an OECD government, United States agencies, and
United States sponsored agencies. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,642, 66,644 (1994). A perfected
security interest is not required. Id. If only a portion of the asset is collateralized that
portion is assigned to the 20% category while the remainder is assigned to its appro-
priate risk weight category. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A (III)(B)(1), at 233-34 (1994).
75. These assets apply to state nonmember banks only. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
76. A conditional guarantee requires some affirmative action for the promise to
be valid, as in servicing requirements. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(c)(8) at 20 (1994).
That portion of an asset not fully guaranteed is assigned to its appropriate risk weight,
and a claim covered by guarantees of different risk weights should be apportioned
between the risk weights. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A (Ill)(B)(2) at 234 (1994).
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and claims on United States government sponsored agencies;' and
certain privately issued securities representing ownership in govern-
ment agencies.78 Also included in the twenty percent category are
most forms of senior United States and OECD bank debt. 9 Regula-
tors can afford banks this low risk weight for these assets because reg-
ulators closely monitor and control their financial condition. They
also want to encourage interbank lending as a means of achieving
bank liquidity. Also in this category, are the general obligations of
states and municipalities as well as OECD local governments.80 Fi-
nally, this category includes two assets that have some element of col-
lection risk: cash items in the _rocess of collection8' and assets
collateralized by cash on deposit.'
iii. Fifty Percent Category
The fifty percent category is somewhat anomalous. It provides a
low risk weight for certain assets, not because a fifty percent risk
weight accurately reflects the danger of default, but because encour-
aging banks to hold these assets advances the public policy goal of
encouraging the creation and ownership of residential housing. The
main components of this category include consumer first mortgage
debt that is not past due, loans to builders to finance construction of
presold homes,8a and privately issued mortgage backed securities.
Congress consolidated these three residential housing assets within
the same category in an effort to alleviate the inefficiency created by
77. Government sponsored agencies differ from government agencies in that their
obligations are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
Government. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A, Attachment M, at 246 n.2 (1994).
78. See supra notes 68 and 77 for a discussion of government agencies.
79. Bank debt incorporates short and long-term claims, and portions thereof, that
are guaranteed by United States and OECD banks. Examples include bankers' ac-
ceptances and standby letters of credit. See 12 C.F.R pt. 325 app. A (II)(C)(2), at 169
n.19 (1994).
80. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (II)(C) at 169 (1994).
81. Cash items in the process of collection are comprised of checks or drafts drawn
on another bank that are payable upon presentation to that bank's clearing office. 12
C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(c)(4) at 20 (1994); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(2)(iii) at 28
(1994).
82. Collateralization only applies to state nonmember banks that are supervised
by the FDIC. The OCC and the Fed put assets collateralized by cash on deposit in the
0% risk category. See supra notes 72 and 74. The FDIC is also considering a reduc-
tion in the risk weight associated with certain collateralized transactions. Report to
Congressional Committees Regarding Differences in Capital and Accounting Stan-
dards Among the Federal Banking and Thrift Agencies, 60 Fed. Reg. 3227, 3230
(1995).
83. 58 Fed. Reg. 12,149 (1993) (implementing § 618(a) of the Resolution Trust
Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L No.
102-233, 105 Stat. 1761 (1991) [hereinafter RTCRRIA], which required all agencies to
lower single family residential construction loans from the 100% to the 50% category
in order to facilitate lending to creditworthy builders).
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the reporting burden these regulations place on banks.' This cate-
gory also contains credit equivalents of interest rate and exchange rate
contracts,85 OECD public sector project financed debt, 6 and revenue
bonds of state and local governments.87
iv. One Hundred Percent Category
The one hundred percent category, the default category, includes
most bank assets.18 Most notably, this category includes all commer-
cial and private sector loans. All other assets and claims of a bank
that do not fit into the zero, twenty, or fifty percent categories are
assigned a one hundred percent risk weight. Banks must hold a mini-
mum capital cushion of eight percent against these assets, which in-
clude the bank premises, fixed assets, real estate, unsecured and most
secured loans.89 Also, state or local obligations repayable solely by a
private party must meet the full eight percent capital requirement.
b. Off-Balance Sheet Items
Off-balance sheet items90 are current commitments that do not in-
volve a transfer of funds until some later date and are not reflected on
84. RTCRRIA, Pub. L. No. 102-233, 105 Stat. 1761, § 618 (1991); see also Robert
G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination: Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insuffi-
cient-Is it Time for Simplification and Incentives?, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 603, 659-60
(1993) (describing the increasing regulatory burden on financial institutions as threat-
ening the financial viability of the banking industry).
85. The credit equivalent of these contracts refers to the process by which off-
balance sheet items are converted into on-balance sheet items. See supra note 90.
86. Public sector entities include states, cities, towns or other municipal corpora-
tions, and any public entity that is the instrument of these political subdivisions, but
does not include commercial companies owned by the public sector engaged in activi-
ties involving trade, commerce, or profit generally performed in the private sector.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(c)(5) & (18) at 21 (1994).
87. These are included in the 50% category because the government entity is only
obligated to pay out of the revenues generated from the financed project rather than
from tax funds. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (II)(C)(3) at 170-71 (1994).
88. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app, A § 3(a)(4) (1994) (enumerating items in the 100% cate-
gory for national banks).
89. Iad Most business loans are either unsecured or secured with personal prop-
erty. Commercial banks, for example, have dominated the installment credit markets
in recent decades. E. Allen Farnsworth et al., Commercial Law 751 (5th ed. 1993).
Also, a large portion of consumer credit is unsecured debt. Id. at 748. Certain collat-
eralized loans, however, fall into the zero percent risk weight. See supra note 72, 74,
and accompanying text.
90. A summary of the credit conversion factors for off-balance sheet items are as
follows: One Hundred Percent Credit Conversion: (1) Direct credit substitutes, such
as standby letters of credit where a bank will indemnify a third party if its customer
fails to perform a contract; regulators are currently proposing to amend the CAGs to
allow less capital to be held against low level recourse transactions. See 59 Fed. Reg.
27,116 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3,208,225, 325 & 567) (proposed May
25, 1994) (proposing OCC, Fed, and FDIC rules concerning recourse and direct credit
substitutes and market risk). (2) Risk participations in bankers' acceptances and in
direct credit substitutes, for example, a time draft drawn on and accepted by the bank
on which it was drawn, bankers' acceptances resemble commercial paper in that they
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the balance sheet. These items include general guarantees and guar-
antee type instruments such as standby commitments and letters of
credit.9' Depending on the amount of assets outstanding, off-balance
sheet items can significantly affect the risk exposure of the bank.9
Determining the value of off-balance sheet items is a two-step process.
First, the bank multiplies the item by a conversion factor that converts
it into an on-balance sheet equivalent. Then, the new on-balance
sheet equivalent can be placed in its proper risk category as would any
other asset.
2. Capital
The previously discussed assets are funded mostly with capital and
deposits. 93 The total of these two sources of funds is typically far less
than the assets a bank holds.94 To prevent banks from becoming too
highly leveraged on depositor funds alone, regulations require banks
are short term and sold at a discount. They differ in that they are backed both by the
goods they finance in addition to the bank that issued them. See Marcia Stigum, The
Money Market 57-58 (3d ed. 1990). (3) Repurchase agreements, which are agree-
ments to repurchase securities at a fixed price and date, are often done overnight;
"repos" are essentially loans with the securities acting as collateral. See id. at 44-46.
(4) Futures contracts, which are agreements to buy or sell securities in the future at a
specified price. See Banking Terminology 166 (3d ed. 1989). (5) Indemnification of
customers whose securities the bank lends as agent; for example, if the bank lends its
own securities (as in a repurchase agreement) or those of a customer whom it must
indemnify, the conversion factor will be 100% and assigned to the proper risk weight
category. See Legal Developments, 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 153, 167 (1989). These as-
sets are given a 100% risk weight so the full value of the assets is transferred to the
balance sheet and assigned to its proper risk weighted category discussed above. See
supra parts I.B.L.ai-iv. Fifty Percent Credit Conversion: (1) Performance bonds,
which are issued to guarantee the insured will perform work within the terms of the
contract, see Banking Terminology 264 (3d ed. 1989), and performance based standby
letters of credit. (2) Available credit with a maturity exceeding one year; commit-
ments of one year or less have a zero percent conversion factor and so are not taken
into account. (3) Revolving underwriting facilities and note issuance facilities, which
are arrangements where borrowers can issue short term paper in their own names and
the paper is guaranteed by the bank or group of banks. See id. at 247, 310. Twenty
Percent Credit Conversion: Commercial letters of credit, which are simply letters of
credit issued by a bank for its customer promising to pay the seller upon presentation
of documents that represent receipt of goods. See id. at 70. Zero Percent Credit Con-
version: (1) Unused portion of commitments with an original maturation period of
one year or less. (2) Unused portion of commitments with an original maturity of
greater than one year if unconditionally cancelable at the option of the bank where
the bank makes a credit decision before each drawing or at least an annual credit
review. (3) Unused portion of credit card lines unconditionally cancelable by banks.
These are deemed to be short term commitments if the bank has the right to cancel
the line of credit at any time. Legal Developments, 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 153, 169
(1989).
91. See Neal S. Millard & Brian W. Semkow, The New Risk-Based Capital Frame-
work and its Application to Letters of Credit, 106 Banking LJ. 500, 506-07 (1989).
92. See Frank C. Puleo, Balance Sheet Restructuring Capital Adequacy, 552 Prac-
ticing L. Inst. 341, 350 (1990).




to maintain a capital cushion equal to eight percent of risk-weighted
assets. The CAGs divide this eight percent into two classes of capital,
Tier 1 and Tier 2, which, when added together, comprise Total
Capital.9 5
a. Tier I Capital
Tier 1 must comprise at least fifty percent of Total Capital.96 Tier 1
capital is secure capital in the traditional sense in that it may include
only the following three components, none of which may contain
goodwill or the value of any intangible asset, with some exceptions. 97
The first component of Tier 1 capital incorporates the initial invest-
ment of a bank's common stockholders. 98 The second component is
the more modem, yet safe, noncumulative perpetual preferred stock99
and related surplus.100 Finally, regulators allow minority interests in
the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries to be counted as Tier
1 capital.101
95. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(c)(25) at 22 (1994).
96. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A (ll)(A)(1), at 228 (1994); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A, tbl.
4-Definition of Capital, at 30 (1994).
97. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 2(c)(1)(i) & (ii) at 23 (1994). Generally, all intangible
assets must be deducted from Tier 1 capital. Intangible assets include goodwill, de-
fined as the value given to "such considerations as a firm's strong reputation,
favorable location, and good relations with [ ] customers." Banking Terminology 170
(3d ed. 1989). Other intangible assets include purchased mortgaging rights and
purchased credit card relationships, which need not be deducted from Tier 1 capital if
no more that 50% of Tier 1 capital is intangible assets and no more that 25% is
purchased credit card relationships. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 2(c)(2) at 23 (1994).
The intangibles included in Tier 1 are valued at the lesser of 90% of market value or
100% of book value determined quarterly. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 2(c)(2)(i) at 23
(1994).
98. While regulators allow noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and minority
interests in consolidated subsidiaries, it is "desirable from a supervisory standpoint
that voting common stockholders' equity remain the dominant form of Tier 1 capital."
Legal Developments, 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 153, 158 (1989). Nonvoting common
stock, noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in consoli-
dated subsidiaries are allowed in Tier 1, but "voting common stockholders' equity
generally will be expected to be the dominant form of Tier 1 capital." 12 C.F.R. pt.
325 app. B (IV) at 179 (1994).
99. Preferred stock receives dividends before other equity securities. It has a par
value, a stated dividend rate, and usually has optional redemption provisions similar
to debt. John D. Fmnerty, Corporate Financial Analysis 346-47 (1986). Perpetual pre-
ferred stock means preferred stock that has no maturity date and cannot be redeemed
at the option of the holder. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(p) (1994). Noncumulative means the
dividends on the stock can be waived and do not accumulate to future periods or
represent a contingent claim on the issuer. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(o) (1994).
100. Surplus is generally the amount paid for stock that exceeds the par value of
the stock. See Banking Terminology 334 (3d ed. 1989).
101. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 2(a)(3) at 22 (1994). An unconsolidated invest-
ment in a subsidiary occurs when a parent has not eliminated its investment in the
subsidiary company on its balance sheet as required by GAAP. Dictionary of Ac-
counting (3d ed. 1989). If the subsidiaries are not consolidated for supervisory pur-
poses the minority equity interests will not be included in Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital.
Puleo, supra note 92, at 352. This element is included in Tier 1 because it represents
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b. 7er 2 Capital
Tier 2 capital consists of four principal items. The smallest compo-
nent is loan loss reserves. These are allowed to reach a maximum of
1.25% of risk-weighted assets.'12 Second, Tier 2 capital includes a
high paying form of stock, cumulative perpetual preferred stock, 0 3 as
well as intermediate preferred stock and related surplus. The third
constituent are hybrid capital instruments, but these instruments must
meet a host of specifications to ensure they will be available to offset a
bank's losses.'" Finally, debt instruments, which differ from equity in
that they have a contractual preference on earnings, 0 5 are allowed to
form part of Tier 2 capital1°6 as long as they are subordinate to the
claims of general creditors.
What is most noticeable about the elements of Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital is the relatively small role stockholder equity actually plays.
With an eight percent minimum capital-to-risk-weighted assets ratio
and only fifty percent of that eight percent having to be Tier 1 capital,
it is possible that less than four percent of total capital will be stock-
holder equity. As discussed previously, public policy historically dic-
tated minimum levels of corporate capital'0 7 that were set forth in
state statutes.108 Traditionally, capital was associated with stockholder
equity-the amount of money stockholders invest and risk losing in a
equity available to absorb losses. See Legal Developments, 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 153,
159 (1989).
102. The limitation on inclusion of loan reserves in capital was debated between
bankers and regulators. "Trade groups argued against the limit on loan loss reserve
inclusion in supplementary capital, as well as its exclusion from core capital, claiming
it would not provide an incentive for banks to reserve adequately for loan losses.
These groups claimed that such reserves were no different from common equity, be-
cause they are permanent, subordinate, and available to absorb potential losses on an
ongoing basis. In response, the Fed stated that capital is a buffer to unanticipated
losses, not specific losses, as in a loan loss reserve." Gordon, supra note 2, at 508
(citations omitted).
103. Whereas during profitless years common stock and regular preferred stock re-
ceive no dividends, cumulative preferred stock receives dividends that accumulated
during profitless years. See Banking Terminology 94 (3d ed. 1989).
104. These instruments contain elements of equity and debt. They must be un-
secured, subordinated to the claims of depositors and creditors, fully paid up, redeem-
able only on approval by the appropriate regulator, available to participate in losses,
and deferrable as to both principal and interest if the issuer reports no profit for four
quarters or eliminates dividends on its stock. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 2(b)(3)(i)-(iv) at
22-23 (1994).
105. Preferred stock and debt share common characteristics. Absent income taxes
preferred stock is a less expensive manner to raise funds. See Finnerty, supra note 99,
at 350.
106. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A (Il)(A)(2)(c)(1) & (II)(A)(2)(c)(d) at 229-30 (1994).
107. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
108. See Norton, supra note 1, at 1348. For national banks, minimum capital is
determined by 12 U.S.C. § 51. It can be from $100,000 to $200,000 depending on the
population of the city in which the bank is located. However, the OCC's regulations
require a minimum of $1 million in capital, after expenses, to start a national bank. 12
U.S.C. § 51 (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(3)(iii) (1994).
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corporate entity.10 9 Allowing shareholder equity to compose such a
small percentage of regulatory capital seems to subvert the goal of
increasing owner liability as risk increases. An increase in financial
risk, however, also increases the risk for debtholders." 0 Thus, when
bondholders agree to subordinate their claims to the claims of credi-
tors and depositors, debt performs the same function as equity."'
C. Justification for Regulation and CAGs
This section will set out various justifications for the imposition of
CAGs on banks. The most prevalent justification for banking regula-
tion is to maintain the efficient flow of funds from those with a funds
surplus to those with a funds deficit. Banks accomplish this essential
function by transferring unused depositors' funds to individuals and
businesses in the form of loans. This transfer and the augmentation of
capital it produces forms the basis of our economy. The additional
justifications for CAGs are corollaries to this primary concern. They
include curbing bank expansion, increasing public confidence in
banks, mitigating moral hazard problems, improving liquidity, and
standardizing regulation so banks can compete on an equal footing
with other financial institutions.
1. Essential Function of Financial Intermediaries
A strong rationale for the imposition of strict capital requirements
comes from the uniquely public attributes of banks as "the holders of
the national savings; the transmitters for monetary policy; the primary
vehicles for effecting an efficient payment system through the econ-
omy; and the main source of backup liquidity in the economy."'
Banks provide an efficient payment system that, despite its costs, al-
lows the rest of the economy to operate more efficiently." 3 Banks
and S&Ls are the principal financial intermediaries in our economy.
They solicit funds in the form of demand deposits and time deposits
109. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
110. Finnerty, supra note 99, at 177.
111. Id. at 189-92. For banks, the benefit of subordinated debt is that the interest
payments are tax deductible. Id.; see generally Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources
of Market Discipline, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 347, 350 (1993) (recommending an increased
role for subordinated debt in bank's capital structure). Cf. Richard Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 449 (1992) (noting that a better method of protecting banks would be
to forbid them to have any debt at all).
112. Norton, supra note 1, at 1349. Commercial banks are the principal financial
intermediaries in the country. Stigum, supra note 90, at 15. Other examples of finan-
cial intermediaries include S&Ls, insurance companies, pension and retirement funds,
finance companies, money market and mutual funds, and securities brokers and deal-
ers. Id.
113. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 63. For a discussion of banking's role in the pay-
ment system see Hans J. Blommestein & Bruce J. Summers, Banking and the Payment
System, in The Payment System: Design, Management, and Supervision 15-28 (Bruce
J. Summers ed., International Monetary Fund 1994).
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from individuals with a surplus of savings and pass these funds on in
the form of loans and investments to companies and individuals who
have a deficit of funds." 4 By acting as intermediaries, banks augment
capital, creating money without changing the amount of currency in
circulation thereby enabling the economy to grow." 5 Normally, com-
petition is desirable because it promotes efficiency; banking is the ex-
ception to this rule." 6 For example, prohibitive regulation, such as
restricting entry into the banking system, prevents competition that
would threaten the reliability of banks." 7 Similarly, regulators im-
pose CAGs to ensure that banks do not risk depositors' funds without
an adequate capital cushion; in doing so, regulators protect the sound-
ness of the banking system." 8 The positive effects CAGs produce for
the rest of the economy justify the inefficiency and costs that such
regulations impose on the banking industry." 9
2. Regulatory Restraints on Unjustified Expansion
Increasing capital prohibits banks from avoiding financial difficul-
ties or insolvency by making more loans to produce more income.' 20
Troubled banks are not able to leverage more, and probably riskier,12'
assets on their existing capital because CAGs prohibit them from ad-
ding assets without raising capital in the form of equity or debt.2'
From the stockholder's point of view, the essence of banking is to
raise the return on equity through leverage.'m CAGs curb this ten-
dency to leverage more and more. This restraint allows well-endowed
banks to increase the assets on their balance sheets or branch and
prohibits marginal institutions from growing or branching.
114. See Stigum, supra note 90, at 13-19.
115. 1& at 17.
116. Posner, supra note 111, at 449. Cf. Gowland, supra note 2, at 9 (challenging the
assumption that regulation of financial markets is necessary).
117. Lovett, supra note 2, at 1373.
118. See id; Taylor, supra note 2, at 96-97.
119. See Gowland, supra note 2, at 41.
120. George M. Bollenbacher, The New Business of Banking 92-99 (1992).
121. See supra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text.
122. Federal agencies are required to review capital requirements together biennu-
ally. 12 U.S.C. § 18 28(p) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Regulators, however, require banks
to file certain financial data annually, biannually, or quarterly. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
§ 18.4 (1994) (requiring certain financial data be filed annually); 12 C.F.R. § 8.2
(1994) (requiring certain financial data be filed biannually); 12 C.F.R. § 4.11 (1994)
(requiring that certain financial data be submitted quarterly to the OCC and that
examinations of the bank must be made twice annually). If a weakness is found in an
institution, prompt corrective action ("PCA") is to be taken. Under PCA, within 45
days after becoming less than adequately capitalized, a bank must submit a plan
(which is accepted or rejected within 60 days) to meet its capital requirements. See
Stephen K. Huber, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, 109 Banking LJ. 300, 316-17 (1992).
123. Stigum, supra note 90, at 186.
124. Frederick D. Lipman, Guest Headnote: New Risk-Based Capital Guidelines
Will Change Banks' Future, 107 Banking LJ. 3, 4 (1990).
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3. Bolstering Public Confidence
In theory, increased capital levels at banks will settle the minds of
depositors who know that there is a larger cushion between poor bank
loans and their deposits.1' Federal deposit insurance, however, has
removed the incentive for depositors to examine the capital structure
of individual banks. 26 Consequently, the main effect of CAGs on the
public is systemic: increased capital results in fewer bank failures,
producing a stronger feeling that banks are safe places for individuals
to keep their savings. The 1980s taught regulators that systemwide
risk 2 7 can be even more devastating than poor management, exces-
sive risk taking, or fraud. Loans to Latin American countries, agricul-
ture interests, real estate interests, and oil interests increased bank
risk throughout the United States.' 2 8 The strengthened role of capital
provides a larger cushion against systemic as well as systemwide risks
such as inflation, war, and recession.'" 9
4. Mitigating the Moral Hazard Problem
In banking, the problem of moral hazard is particularly evident. If
an institution is highly leveraged, a great incentive to engage in riskier
investments exists because of the potential for big gains. If the worst
occurs, and a bank becomes insolvent, federal deposit insurance bears
the burden of paying depositors while limited corporate liability pro-
tects management in the absence of actual fraud. The disincentive to
participate in risky activities exists only to the extent that manage-
ment has an ownership interest in the bank or management fears
losing their employment. Unfortunately, bonuses compensating man-
agers for profitable performance counteract this disincentive.
125. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 587.
126. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 Ohio
St. L.J. 1277, 1280 (1989) ("In the absence of deposit insurance, of course, bank de-
positors would face potential losses whenever the banks in which they had deposits
become insolvent .... [Iun the presence of deposit insurance theses depositors are
completely insulated from the consequences of bank failure .. ").
127. The Comptroller of Currency distinguished systemic risks from systemwide
risks.
The first involves a sudden, usually unexpected, collapse of confidence in a
significant portion of the banking or financial system with potentially large
real economic impacts. Let us call these 'systemic' risks. The second in-
volves macro-economic cycles, new product trends and other developments
that may not be sudden, but that affect large portions of the industry and
carry substantial safety and soundness implications. Just to confuse you, I
will call these 'systemwide' risks.
Remarks by Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of Currency, before the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, on bank supervi-
sion, Chicago, Ill., May 12, 1994, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency QJ., Sept. 1994,
at 63.
128. See Lovett, supra note 2, at 1377-79.
129. See id. at 1378.
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CAGs attempt to mitigate this hazard. Without the imposition of
CAGs, banks would not have incentive to hold enough capital to
cover the public costs of bank failure.130 This is true because deposits,
as an alternative to capital, are a much less costly liability to incur. 31
Capital is more expensive because shareholders demand a higher re-
turn on their investment than do depositors. A shareholder's money
remains completely at risk, while the FDIC guarantees depositors
funds up to $100,000.132 Deposit insurance, therefore, subsidizes
banks by allowing them to pay a low interest rate for federally guaran-
teed deposits.
As a result of the availability of inexpensive deposits, capital levels
at banks have traditionally been the lowest among financial institu-
tions. 133 "Securities firms, insurance companies, and finance compa-
nies all have capital ratios of fifteen percent or more."''34 These two
factors, low capital investment and federally insured funds, put both
bank management 35 and owners in a position where they have little
at stake but much to gain from risky investments. 136 As capital levels
decrease, the moral hazard becomes greater because investors have
less to lose. Regulators respond to this problem by raising capital re-
quirements. If a bank holds high risk assets, CAGs demand that a
minimum of eight percent of the stockholders and subordinated debt
holders' money be on hand to absorb unexpected losses. This capital
cushion protects both the depositors and the taxpayers who ultimately
pay for failed banks. 3 7
5. Liquidity
CAGs give banks incentive to hold liquid, safe investments by low-
ering the amount of capital they must hold in relation to these assets.
In some cases, assets require no capital support at all, such as those
130. Stephen M. Schaefer, Financial Regulation: The Contribution of the Theory of
Finance, in The Internationalisation of Capital Markets and the Regulatory Response
149, 151 (John Fmgleton ed., 1992).
131. See id.
132. 12 U.S.C § 1813(m) (1988).
133. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 31, at 97,359.
134. George G. Kaufman, The U.S. Financial System: Money Markets and Institu-
tions 189 (5th ed. 1992).
135. Generally all corporate managers, who are not themselves heavily invested in
the companies they run, have a moral hazard problem because the money they gam-
ble with is not their own. Bank managers are more susceptible to moral hazard be-
cause most of the funds they gamble with are insured by the federal government.
136. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 31, at 97,361.
137. See Kane, supra note 1, at 39. When banks fail either the Bank Insurance
Fund will pay for the losses or the government will have to bail out the fund. In either
case, the costs are eventually passed on to the taxpayer or the bank customer through
higher fees and interest rates.
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that fall into the zero percent risk weight category.13 s When more
liquid funds are available, an unexpected surge in withdrawals or pay-
ments will less likely cause a bank to fail to meet its current obliga-
tions.139 CAGs, thus, guard against liquidity risk.140
6. The Level Playing Field
A primary objective of the Basle Agreement was to "diminish[ ] an
existing source of competitive inequality among international
banks.' 14 1 For example, if two countries have different capital re-
quirements for their banks, and those banks are competing against
each other, the cost of doing business for the bank with the higher
capital requirement is greater because that bank will have to raise
more capital to control the same amount of assets. Theoretically, lev-
eling the playing field removes other considerations allowing investors
to choose the highest rate of return for a given level of risk. 42 Banks,
in turn, must respond to the needs of investors by creating a more
efficient system for maximizing value without adding cost. 43 Nation-
ally, CAGs prohibit the establishment of a level playing field.'"n This
problem and others will be addressed in Part II.
The previously enumerated reasons for imposing CAGs on banks
are substantial and sound. They were imposed to improve the bank-
ing system by changing the behavior of banks. Congress has noted
that CAGs have required a major readjustment by the banking indus-
try.'45 The change in banks' behavior, however, was supposed to
strengthen and stabilize the banking system, but in many ways CAGs
have, and will continue to, hurt the banking industry and the econ-
omy. 46 Part II explores both the good and bad that CAGs have
wrought.
138. Treasury bills, for example, are highly liquid instruments that yield a relatively
low rate of interest. A bank need hold no capital to support such an asset. For a
detailed discussion of the risk weight categories see discussion infra part I.B.1.
139. See Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale LJ. 1,
55 (1976).
140. Liquidity risk is the risk that a party will not settle a payment when it is due. It
differs from credit risk in that liquidity risk does not necessarily mean a loss but
merely a delay that could be costly. See Jeffrey C. Marquardt, Payment System Policy
Issues and Analysis, in The Payment System: Design, Management, and Supervision
136-37 (Bruce J. Summers ed., International Monetary Fund 1994).
141. See Basle Agreement, supra note 29, at 3309.
142. See Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Con-
trol Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 129, 129 n.1 (1986).
143. See id.
144. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
145. See H.R. Rep. No. 410, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19. (1993).
146. Congress has shown concern for the long range effects CAGs have on lending,
especially to small businesses. See id.
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II. THE ElFEcrs oF REGULATORY CAPITAL
CAGs have affected not only banks, but bank customers, taxpayers,
and the economy. A brief overview of bank asset management is nec-
essary in order to demonstrate the CAGs' effect upon individual bank
profitability. Then, the impact on the banking industry can be dis-
cussed, and finally, the manner in which changes in banking affects
everyone associated with banks.
CAGs prevent banks from putting capital to its highest value use, at
least the highest value from the bank's perspective.147 Banks must
allocate capital in quantities that regulators regard as sufficiently safe
to ensure the stability of individual banks and the banking system.
Regulators, while concerned with ensuring bank solvency, do not pri-
marily concern themselves with individual bank profit. Maintaining
the credit function of individual banks, and thereby protecting the
banking system, is of greater importance to regulators. 118 The stabil-
ity of individual banks poses a concern for regulators because the fail-
ure of one bank may lead to a lack of confidence in other banks
prompting withdrawals, increased incidents of bank failure, and weak-
ening the banking system.14 9 The resulting disintermediation would
harm the economy.150
One effect of across-the-board capital requirements is that they
harm individual banks in an effort to make the banking system more
stable. Suprisingly, CAGs may actually increase bank failure in the
process of strengthening the banking system.' 51 Under FDICIA, reg-
ulators have broad authority to compel recapitalization of undercapi-
talized banks.'52 If a bank has less than two percent capital, regulators
may close the bank even though it is still solvent. 5 3 When capital dips
below acceptable levels, regulators can restrict asset growth,'-' pre-
vent banks from paying dividends,55 and prohibit banks from solicit-
147. From the regulators' perspective, capital is put to a better use if it is used to
protect the banking system rather than the individual bank.
148. Most banking law and regulation is concerned with protecting and encourag-
ing this essential function. See, eg., Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank
Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 429, 429-30 (1994) (analyzing the failure of gov-
ernment intervention that took the form of deregulation in the 1980s in light of the
successful government response to the banking crisis of the 1930s) [hereinafter Gar-
ten, Bank Failure Resolution].
149. See Nicholas A. Lash, Banking Laws and Regulations: An Economic Perspec-
tive 23 (1987).
150. UL; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
151. See Helen A. Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?,
1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 749, 793-94 (1992) [hereinafter Garten, Market Discipline].
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. V 1993).
153. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993); 12 C.F.R. § 303.9 (1994).
"The institution must be seized and placed in receivership if, on average, it remains
critically undercapitalized during the calendar quarter beginning 270 days after the
institution first falls into that condition." Baxter, supra note 18, at 521.
154. Baxter, supra note 18, at 521.
155. IdL at 520-21.
1995] 2417
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ing deposits from brokers. 156 These measures can have damaging
effects. Such effects are especially evident when the reason for low
capital is not poor management, but a narrower profit margin. In
most cases, banks experiencing financial difficulty need lower, not
higher, capital requirements.
Equity capital may decline because of lower profits, weaker assets
or too rapid growth .... For the banking industry as a whole, eq-
uity capital ratios are now higher than they have been for two de-
cades. But the industry does not seem any stronger, or more willing
to lend freely .... If undercapitalized banks are effectively barred
from competitive funding markets, they will either shrink or fail. 157
Troubled banks usually need improved management not more capital.
Even a large capital cushion will not maintain a distressed bank for
long. CAGs, thus, fail to address a fundamental problem with the
banking industry. Capital standards are designed to maintain the safe
operation of banks, but when the regulatory environment burdens
banks with a competitive disadvantage, fewer banks will be able to
compete with nonbank competitors or money center banks.158
A. Bank Operations and Capital Management
Banks use capital differently than most companies. Rather than as
a source of funds available to finance buildings and equipment, banks
use capital as protection against unforeseeable losses.' 1 9 The eight
percent figure that banks must maintain, however, is arbitrary 60 and
can be harmful to an institution that needs to manage its capital struc-
ture differently.16' Each individual bank's ideal capital structure var-
156. 12 U.S.C § 1831f (Supp. V 1993).
157. Garten, Market Discipline, supra note 151, at 793-94.
158. Money center banks or money market banks are the largest banks in the
United States. They are important players in major markets including the Fed funds
market, the repo market, the government and agency securities market, and other
securities markets as well as the derivatives market. These banks engage in a various
businesses in addition to traditional banking such as dealing in domestic securities,
foreign capital markets and clearing securities for other dealers. Stigum, supra note
90, at 118-21.
159. See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Stan-
dards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 Dick. J. Int'l L. 189, 190
(1992).
160. "'That figure was seat-of-the-pants stuff,' admits Peter Cooke, the former
Bank of England official who chaired the BIS Committee on Banking Supervision
that hammered out the Basel Agreement." David Fairlamb, Beyond Capital, Institu-
tional Investor, Aug. 1994, at 42.
161. Notwithstanding the theoretical appeal of increased capital requirements,
there are significant problems with relying exclusively or even principally on
this approach. First of all, there are considerable difficulties in determining
exactly how far capital reserves should be raised. As was true in the case of
risk-regulation through activity restrictions, optimal capital reserve require-
ments are likely to vary greatly from institution to institution, even within a
sinee segment of the financial services industry. Recent events suggest that
political pressures and theoretical dissension have combined at different
2418 [Vol. 63
1995] CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES 2419
ies depending on many factors 16  that CAGs do not take into
account.1 63 Moreover, overcapitalized banks harm society by divert-
ing capital from more productive uses.' 64
1. Measuring the Maturity Gap
CAGs intrude upon the primary function of bank management-to
maximize profits while maintaining an acceptable level of perceived
risk.1 65 Banks must manage risk in an environment where capital reg-
ulations, deposits, and the current economic climate are outside a
bank's control. 66 Within a bank's control is its asset portfolio. Banks
normally fund their asset portfolios with relatively short term liabili-
ties: deposits, Federal funds, 67 repos,'" and other money market in-
struments. Banks must attempt to measure the average maturity of
assets and liabilities to divine the inevitable mismatch in the bank's
position.' 69 Management constantly monitors the time gap between
liability and asset maturity so that the gap does not grow so large as to
interrupt cash flow or expose the bank to too great a rate risk.170 If
cash flow is interrupted and withdrawals are not met, the bank is in-
times to fix capital requirements either too low or too high. But even if the
capital reserve requirements were properly calibrated for a hypothetical fi-
nancial institution, the ratio might still be too high or too low for particular
firms within this industry.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 587-88.
162. See Finnerty, supra note 99, at 175-95.
163. Minimum capital requirements in themselves do not demarcate safe versus un-
safe or sound versus unsound banking activity. Rather, the FDIC requirement that a
bank maintain capital at a specified level is nothing more than an alarm triggering full
evaluation of the bank's condition-nothing more than a signal that a particular bank
has reached or is approaching an unsafe or unsound capital position. Metzger, supra
note 25, at 254-55.
164. Butler & Dugan, supra note 1, at 872.
165. Stigum, supra note 90, at 122.
166. See id.
167. Federal funds are the reserves, required by law, to be kept on account at a
bank's local Federal Reserve Branch. A bank with a funds deficit can borrow from
other banks with surplus funds. This usually occurs on an overnight basis because of
the volatility in the amount of funds a bank may have on any given day. Id. at 42-44,
177.
168. Government securities dealers use repurchase agreements, repos for short, to
finance overnight borrowing of funds to finance their positions. Id. at 44. Banks use
repos instead of deposits because repo funds require no FDIC premiums and no re-
serve requirement. Id at 179.
169. Id. at 126-27.
170. Id. at 127. Rate risk or interest rate exposure is a traditional risk in banking.
Banks lend funds for long periods of time while their deposits base and borrowing
avenues are usually short term. If interest rates rise, banks will be paying more
money for short term funds while receiving less money from their long term loans. Of
course, banks can profit when interest rates fall and money is inexpensive. Banks
cannot perfectly match maturities because many of their assets and liabilities do not
have definite maturities. Id at 126. Instead, banks pool their assets and liabilities and
determine the average of both and match the overall position of the portfolio. Id.
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solvent.17 1 The more liquid a bank's assets the less capital it needs to
hold and vice versa.17 Even with.CAG requirements, capital is only a
small percentage of assets and can only protect against short term loss
that results from such temporary volatility. 73 It cannot protect a bank
that is not profitable. 74 With actual bank capital ratios at above ten
percent, 75 CAGs force bankers to focus on higher profits margins
rather than asset growth.' 76 Because of this shift in perspective, banks
can cover unforeseeable losses with incoming revenue rather than
with the capital cushion. 1 77 The increased concentration on maximiz-
ing profit is a positive effect of CAGs, but regulators have failed to
address banks' abilities to compete profitably with higher capital
levels.
2. Asset Management
Commercial banks are the largest discrete group of financial in-
termediaries and the largest suppliers of credit to business firms, con-
sumers, the federal government, and state and local governments.'
They hold assets in the form of debt, mostly in the form of business
loans and mortgages. Government securities make up the second
largest pool of bank assets.179 Banks have incentive to hold govern-
ment securities because they are in the zero percent risk category.' 80
Investment in government securities, however, does not ensure stabil-
ity and safety. The relatively low rate of return Treasury Bills offer
can be inappropriate when interest rates are rising."18 The growth and
stability of banks depend more on the type of services they can offer
and the cost of funds (transaction and time deposits) in relation to the
return they produce than the amount of liquid funds a bank may have
on hand at any given time. Banks often hold large quantities of gov-
ernment securities for liquidity purposes and for profit, especially
when interest rates are falling."8 Rising interest rates force banks to
maintain their governments by raising more capital or shedding higher
171. Technically, insolvency is the inability to pay debts on maturity, or having a
negative net worth. The two are distinguishable but may have the same effect. The
first may be due to illiquidity. See supra part I.C.5 (offering improved liquidity as a
rationale for CAGs); see also supra text accompanying notes 54, 254-63 (describing
lack of liquidity as leading to insolvency).
172. Kaufman, supra note 134, at 167.
173. Taylor, supra note 2, at 43.
174. Id.
175. See Fairlamb, supra note 160, at 44. Indeed, the top 20 banks now have be-
tween 13% and 26% total capital ratios. Id. at 40. Eight percent is a minimum capital
requirement. Id.
176. Id
177. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 97.
178. Kaufman, supra note 134, at 172.
179. See id
180. See supra part I.B.l.a.i.
181. Stigum, supra note 90, at 125.
182. See id.; see also supra note 170 (discussing interest rate risk).
2420 [Vol. 63
CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES
risk assets. Both are difficult to do. In some years "the case for a
bank to hold any governments was weak at best."'183
CAGs induce banks to counsel customers to collateralize loans with
government or agency securities. This creates an unfair economic ad-
vantage to government organizations that often do the same business
as private organizations. For example, mortgage-backed securities
from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are more attractive collateral than
the same class of securities issued by a private company. Government
organizations often get preferential treatment, but just as often it is at
the expense of the economy because the funds are not being allocated
to a use that maximizes their value.8's The effect is a reduction in
economic productivity.as CAGs thus affect the allocation of re-
sources and impose social costs186 in the purest sense.
It is not uncommon for federal law and regulations to limit the in-
vestment choices banks may make. Examples of such limitations in-
dude prohibiting investment in corporate stocks,"8 limiting the
percentage of assets that may be invested in one borrower,188 limiting
investments in real estate,"s and limiting the interest rate banks may
charge."9 These prohibitions reduce risk in a bank's portfolio,
thereby making the institution more stable.1 91
While CAGs affect a bank's portfolio substantially, they do not take
into account portfolio investment theory. Portfolio risk management
seeks to establish a negative covariation between assets, that is, to es-
tablish a group of assets that will respond differently to the same ex-
ternal economic event so that the return on assets remains stable."9
Measuring risk among investments depends on the interrelationship
between the investments; for example, the same occurrence outside
183. Stigum, supra note 90, at 125.
184. There is nothing level about a playing field in which the United States
Government is a competitor. [I]t seems cear... that Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac will retain their favored position in the marketplace. While Fannie
and Freddie were required to increase capital somewhat, they will continue
to escape many of the regulatory constraints.
Marilyn R. Seymann, Banking's Role in Emerging Secondary Markets, 47 Consumer
Fin. L.Q. Rep. 253,260 (1993); see also Wdliam Pesek Jr. & Allison Penn, Bond Prices
Edge Higher as Participants Await Meeting of the Fed's Policy-Making Committee,
Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1995, at C21 (indicating that banks show a preference for Ginnie
Mae securities because they have to hold less capital against them).
185. See Posner, supra note 111, at 10.
186. Social costs as opposed to private costs can be substantial and diminish the
wealth of a society. Id. at 7, 544-45.
187. 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1988). A bill has been proposed in the House of
Representatives that would repeal this provision and others that have separated com-
mercial and investment banking since 1933. H.R. 18, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See
supra note 360 for further discussion of the proposed bill
188. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
189. 12 U.S.C. §§ 29, 371 (1988).
190. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988).
191. See Clark, supra note 139, at 55.
192. Id. at 51-52.
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the bank's control may decrease profits for a supplier while increasing
profits for a retailer. The system has shown some traditional regula-
tion to be arbitrary: "The principal defense against volatility is diver-
sification, which, if done correctly, will also reduce overall losses for
the portfolio. By diversifying appropriately, a portfolio manager cre-
ates a portfolio with less overall risk than the risk of any single loan or
a narrowly defined group of loans." '193
3. Addressing Management's Moral Hazard
Shifting risk from the FDIC and taxpayers back to depositors and
stockholders mitigates the moral hazard problem. Stockholders (pri-
marily Tier 1) or debt holders (primarily Tier 2) could lower bank risk
taking by monitoring management's decisions to invest in riskier as-
sets for greater profit if they had the proper motivation.' 94 This argu-
ment makes more sense for bondholders who are guaranteed their
income at a constant rate absent severe financial difficulty, 95 than for
stockholders who would reap the benefits of the high reward of risky
investments in the form of dividends and higher value stock. CAGs
put this burden back on the stockholders by forcing them to risk more
funds as management increases risk in the bank's portfolio.
This position, however, is ultimately flawed. Given the nature of
the banking industry, the proposition that stockholders could control
bank investment strategy is unconvincing: Because of all the filings
and approvals required, it is unfeasible for bank investors to oust bad
managers. Bad managers are the primary cause of failed banks.'96
Moreover, most shareholders own only a small fraction of outstanding
stock,197 and are usually widely dispersed making the cost of organiz-
193. John M. Abraham, Good Portfolio Management Needed More than Ever, Am.
Banker, May 18, 1994, at 26; see Clark, supra note 139, at 52.
194. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 586.
195. If a bank becomes critically undercapitalized it will be prohibited from making
payments of principal or interest on subordinated debt. There are five categories of
capitalization under prompt corrective action system. A bank is (1) well capitalized if
it has a total risk-weighted capital of 10% or greater, Tier 1 capital of 6% or greater
and a leverage ratio of 5% or greater, (2) adequately capitalized if it has a total risk-
weighted capital of 8% or greater, Tier 1 capital of 4% or greater and a leverage ratio
of 4% or greater (or 3% or greater if the bank is rated 1 in its most recent examina-
tion), (3) undercapitalized if it has a total risk-weighted capital of lower than 8%, Tier
1 capital lower than 4% and a leverage ratio lower than 4% (unless the bank had a
rating of 1 in its most recent examination). Then it will have to have a ratio of less
than 3%, (4) significantly undercapitalized if it has a total risk-weighted capital less
than 6%, a Tier 1 capital lower than 3% and a leverage ratio lower than 3%, and (5)
critically undercapitalized if the bank has a ratio of tangible equity to total assets that
is equal to 2% or less. 12 C.F.R. § 6.4 (1994).
196. Reid Nagle, Capital Idea: An Analyst's Formula for Restoring Banks to Health
... And What He Thinks of the Proposed Reforms, Barron's, Feb. 11, 1991, at 14, 31.
197. See Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Cor-
porate Democracy, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1993).
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ing prohibitively expensive. 198 Therefore, it is more efficient for
shareholders to devote themselves to investment strategies than to
corporate governance. 199 Management takes advantage of their posi-
tion because stockholders have neither the voting power, the exper-
tise, nor the time to effectively monitor banks. Management,
therefore, does not have to be responsive to stockholders. Empirical
studies suggest that banks encounter agency problems in that manag-
ers can pursue their own interests instead of acting in the best interest
of the bank.2°° In addition, because bank management is large and
complex, it is difficult to assign blame to any one person or group of
persons.201
B. The Practical Effects of the CAGs
The CAGs have affected the banking industry significantly. Some
expected and quantifiable effects are the consolidation and stratifica-
tion of banks and a shift in bank assets. The CAGs, however, also
have added to the problems facing banks by undermining their ability
to compete with nonbank financial companies, reducing the supply of
available credit for businesses and consumers, and compounding the
already burdensome and costly reporting requirements, all the while
failing to account adequately for the risk in bank portfolios.
Eight percent of risk-weighted assets may not appear to be a bur-
densome amount of capital to maintain when considering historical
levels of capital. In the 1840s, bank capital-to-total assets ratios ap-
proached sixty percent.Y Today, in a poor economic environment, an
eight percent capital minimum can have a profound effect on banks.
The fact that capital is important to the regulators makes it im-
portant to us, but it is important to us for another reason. Because
of the way regulation is done in this country, and because of the
regulators' risk-based capital guidelines... the primary constraint to
an institution's being a predator, a survivor, and a winner, is
capital32
0 3
There are a number of ways CAGs make it more difficult for banks to
survive.
198. Id. at 46.
199. Id.
200. See Duane B. Graddy & Austin H. Spencer, Managing Commercial Banks 565
(1990).
201. See id.
202. See Kaufman, supra note 134, at 189.
203. Bollenbacher, supra note 120, at 87.
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1. Tiering and Consolidation
CAGs have split banks down the middle.2" Those banks with
smaller profit margins cannot afford to keep as great a capital cushion,
because their profits are lower.2 0 5 Lower earnings result in smaller
additions to contingent reserves, so banks will not be able to bear loan
default as easily.20 6 They also prevent banks from growing. To obtain
higher profits banks must make riskier loans. The divergence can only
grow wider as well capitalized banks expand and under capitalized
banks struggle to maintain their capital requirements and earnings by
making more profitable and riskier one hundred percent category
loans.20 7 Reliable data support this contention. Since 1989, the
number of national banks has dropped from 4397 to 3262.08 Most of
these losses came from smaller banks, those with assets under $100
million.20 9 Moreover, data from the Comptroller of Currency indicate
that the assets of smaller national banks are shrinking, while those of
larger banks are growing.210
Consolidation 21' and shrinkage of the banking industry below an
optimal level will cause a loss in efficiency.2 12 It can also harm cus-
tomers and suppliers who rely on the current industry structure such
as the low and middle income borrowers who rely primarily on com-
munity banks and thrifts.21 3 Consolidation and shrinkage mainly
eradicate this sector of the industry causing a disproportionate impact
on those customers.21 4 Moreover, consolidation of the banking sys-
204. "[A] tiering has occurred among banks according to their respective capital
levels. Banks with adequate or excess capital are able to raise additional capital at
advantageous rates and are able to take advantage of the resulting wider margins
between loans and bank capital." Alford, supra note 159, at 210-11 (citations
omitted).
205. Fairlamb, supra note 160, at 43.
206. See Gowland, supra note 2, at 14.
207. Alford, supra note 159, at 216-17.
208. Operations of National Banks, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency Q.J., June
1994, at 3.
209. See id. at 5.
210. See icL at 6.
211. Because of the poor capital positions of many banks, CAGs force consolida-
tion. "In New York, we have repeatedly urged our banks to think about consolidation
to strengthen their capital positions and secure greater economies of scale." Jill M.
Considine, A State's Response to the United States Treasury Department Proposals to
Modernize the Nation's Banking System, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S243, S256 (1991).
212. Defining the socially optimal level of capital is extraordinarily difficult.
The task does not just involve replicating the level that various claimants on
financial institutions (such as depositors, equity holders, employees, and sup-
pliers) would bargain for under conditions of perfect competition and
costless information. Rather, third party interests-particularly public inter-
ests in avoiding the externalities of failures-would also have to be factored
in. For purposes of analysis, the optimal level is a hypothetical capital re-
quirement tat factors in all relevant welfare effects.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 588 n.294 (citation omitted).




tern leads to homogenization and nationalization of banks, which is
exactly what the dual banking system of the United States was sup-
posed to prevent.215
2. Increased Competition
By removing many of the obstacles to free competition in financial
services, deregulation made banks more efficient. The failure of de-
regulation, however, has exposed a fundamental incongruity in the
goals of legislators and regulators. They want competitive and effi-
cient banks without bank failure. To accomplish this, regulators have
removed market restrictions to make banks compete more fiercely
while tightening prudential restrictions to ensure banks will not fail
under the increased competition. Market discipline as well as regula-
tory discipline thus encumber banks. In addition, factors such as the
globalization of financial markets, improvements in communication
technology, development of new products, and securitization have
made the financial intermediary market much more competitive.216
At a time when banks need less regulation so they can compete more
effectively, regulators are fine tuning CAGs to a point that approaches
micromanagement.217 In contrast to the spirit of deregulation, CAGs
constitute a reregulation response to the perceived failures of deregu-
lation in the 1980s.2 18 CAGs, however, are not likely to make banks
safer because they curb profit making abilities21 9 in a competitive der-
egulated market by forcing banks to hold more capital than is effi-
cient.2 0 In a system where banks are no longer the sole performers of
the essential function of efficiently making payments,221 they are at
risk not from other banks, but from nonbank financial institutions that
compete with banks for deposits, securities brokering, and loans.
An important goal of the CAGs was to level the playing field z 2
Commentators have noted that considering the number of variables
215. See Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking 11-15 (1992) (excerpting
the debate between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson on the establishment
of a national banking system); Considine, supra note 211, at S244.
216. See Stigum, supra note 90, at 131-33.
217. See Carl Horowitz, National Issue Banking and Deposit Insurance Risk-Based
Fees First Step Toward Privatization?, Investor's Bus. Daily, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al
(describing FDICIA's implementation of CAG enforcement as microscopic
regulation).
218. See Gart, supra note 15, at 7.
219. "'What difference does it make if a bank has no capital or has some capital if
it is now operating profitably?'" Root, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting The Impact of
Bank/Thrift Closures on Local Economies: Hearings Before House Small Business
Commission, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1991) (testimony of Dr. Paul S. Nadler, Profes-
sor of Banking, Rutgers University)).
220. "'Instead of using a static measure like bank capital adequacy, the regulators
should determine the bank's prospects for earning profits now and in the future-
profits that can build up capital over time.'" Id
221. Pierce, supra note 27, at 17.
222. See discussion supra part I.C.6.
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and differences between international financial institutions, achieving
equality is virtually impossible 21 3 This brings into question the impor-
tance of equalizing capital regulations (on a national level) without
equalizing other regulations that govern competing institutions.
CAGs alone certainly do not create a level playing field. To achieve a
level playing field, two prerequisites must be met: (1) regulations
must be reformed to remove competitive inequalities among compet-
ing institutions without any burdensome regulations, and (2) equal ac-
cess to information must be allowed to all participants so they may
evaluate their economic position. 4
As to the first requirement, competitive equality, CAGs apply con-
sistently to depository institutions with few differences225 so financial
institutions gain no advantage or disadvantage in the market. 6 But,
Congress has not applied CAGs to nonbank competitors. By imple-
menting CAGs in a deregulated market, lawmakers and regulators
have removed restrictions on market forces, yet have increased re-
strictions on certain market participants. The complexity and defini-
tional problems associated with CAGs, as well as the confidentiality
afforded banks, make it difficult for market participants to evaluate
the capital base of banks.2 27 Moreover, until tax and accounting stan-
dards are also made uniform across the financial industry, the treat-
ment of capital cannot be uniform.228
Regulatory policy precludes the second requirement, that equal ac-
cess be given to all market participants. Regulators have broad dis-
cretion not to release information about banks.22 9  Regulators'
examinations of banks are always confidential. 230 These rules on dis-
closure of a bank's financial position give regulators an opportunity to
remedy troubled or problem banks before a bank failure can under-
mine public confidence. Regulatory implementation of CAGs, there-
fore, does not meet the goal of leveling the playing field. In fact, such
regulations make competition more difficult. Without removing re-
strictive regulatory constraints on banking activity, banks and their
nonbank competitors will continue to compete under different condi-
tions. Increasing market discipline, under such circumstances, exposes
banks to risks that controvert a sound macroeconomic policy of ensur-
223. See Gowland, supra note 2, at 42.
224. See Norton, supra note 1, at 1355-56.
225. See Capital Standards, supra note 36, at 36,833-37.
226. See Norton, supra note 1, at 1355.
227. See id. at 1357.
228. See id. at 1361.
229. See, e.g., Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R.§ 5.13(a) (1994) (giving regulators ability to withhold information regarding notifica-
tions and decisions if they believe witholding is in the public interest).
230. See Books and Records on National Banks, 12 C.F.R. § 7.6025(c) (1994).
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ing the availability of credit and maintaining the safety and soundness
of banks. 3"
3. Asset Conversion
To maximize asset value, banks must convert, dispose of, or securi-
tize their "high risk" assets. These one hundred percent category as-
sets are prohibitively expensive because they require a bank to hold at
least eight percent of the value of the assets as regulatory capital.
a. Monetization
Banks may choose to monetize their fixed assets by, for example,
selling the bank premises (which fall within the one hundred percent
risk weight category) and arranging for a lease.3 2 Funds from the sale
would generate, as well as free up, regulatory capital enabling the
bank to hold more profitable assets. Banks also may shed assets by
cutting out discrete bank operations such as data processing units and
by hiring outside contractors to do the work, thus reducing the fixed
one hundred percent risk weight assets3 3
b. Risk Category Adjustment
CAGs also encourage banks either to convert high risk assets into
lower risk assets or dispose of them entirely. In the personal loan
market this may mean converting consumer debt to home equity
debt,2 34 consequently reducing a bank's capital requirement by halfP 5
Conversions of this sort will also lower gross profits, because banks
can charge higher interest rates on personal loans than on home eq-
uity loans. The costs imposed by these regulations will eventually be
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher interest rates. This,
in turn, poses two problems: (1) as a public policy matter, less credit
will be available, especially to that segment of the population unable
to secure home equity loans, and (2) banks will be less able to com-
pete with nonbank financial institutions which are not burdened by
regulatory costs. CAGs encourage banks to shed off-balance sheet
commitments such as swaps and exchange contracts, especially in light
of the proposed interest rate regulations that one banker called "im-
precise and inflexible," continuing, "Since we all have different port-
231. See Garten, Market Discipline, supra note 151 at 749, 776-77.
232. Bollenbacher, supra note 120, at 95.
233. Id
234. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 68,735 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208 & 225)(announcing final rule permitting state member banks and bank holding companies to
lower certain multi-family homes loans from 100% to 50%).




folios, we vary in our ability to adjust our positions .... It therefore is
ridiculous to have set rules for the industry as a whole. ' '236
c. Securitization
Traditionally, banks would reduce the risk of a pool of assets
through diversification, but these are assets that remain on the bal-
ance sheet and are subject to capital requirements and as previously
noted, CAGs do not take diversification into account. Through
securitization,237 banks sell shares of these asset pools, often with re-
course, 238 so that the assets no longer have to be secured by a high
capital ratio.239 However, securitization has not necessarily made
banks safer because higher quality assets are more easily securi-
tized.24 ° Many of the loans being securitized are credit card receiv-
ables, car loans, and home equity loans that tend to be lower risk than
business loans.24
The growth of securitization has helped banks transfer risk and
avoid holding excess capital, but it also has changed the financial envi-
ronment so dramatically that it poses a threat to the bank's function as
intermediary. The narrowed profit spread has made traditional bank-
ing less profitable and has given banks more reason to want to enter
investment banking.242 Eventually securitization may remove the
bank between the borrower and the lender. Businesses will be able to
transfer their assets to individuals with a surplus of funds through
marketable financial assets at the speed made available by electronic
transfer.243 Mutual funds2 " allow borrowers to tap directly into the
236. Fairlamb, supra note 160, at 46.
237. Commercial banks and thrifts, their subsidiaries or their holding company
affiliates either originate or buy the loans, mortgages or other assets to be
securitized and then segregate these assets into pools that are relatively ho-
mogenous with respect to credit, maturity and interest rate risk. These pools
of assets are then transferred to a trust or other entity ... that will issue
securities backed by the pool of assets.
Puleo, supra note 92, at 352.
238. ld. at 348.
Asset sales with recourse must be treated on the commercial bank Call Re-
ports as financings, with the result that the assets remain on the balance
sheet and require capital maintenance against the assets. It is thus in the
banks' interest to structure asset sales to avoid recourse or other retention of
risk.
Id
239. See Alan Greenspan, Regulatory Viewpoint... Optimal Bank Supervision in a
Changing World, 76 J. Com. Lending 43, 47 (1994).
240. Fairlamb, supra note 160, at 40.
241. Greenspan, supra note 239, at 48.
242. See Stigum, supra note 90, at 59.
243. Greenspan, supra note 239, at 44.
244. Mutual funds are investment companies that sell certificates that represent a
pool of financial assets. See Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund Indus-
try, 79 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1001, 1001 (1993).
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capital markets without using banks as intermediaries."4 Major man-
ufacturers can issue asset backed securities directly, based on con-
tracts for orders they have signed.'- Small and less credit worthy
businesses will, for the immediate future, still have to go to banks be-
cause they cannot tap the capital markets directly to obtain financ-
ing.247 Nevertheless, the incentive CAGs provide banks to securitize
their assets portends the demise of banks' tradition role in the
economy.
By adopting the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994,28 Congress continued to support securi-
tization by banks while transforming another traditional bank market.
The Act facilitates the securitization of commercial real estate by al-
lowing banks to buy and hold securities of pooled commercial real
estate loans." 9 It also lowers capital requirements by putting them in
the same risk category as government securities. °50 Regulators have
already proposed rules that more accurately measure levels of risk in
pools of loans.251 These are based on the level at which the bank is
contractually liable for losses. 2
4. Ensuring Liquidity
Regulators have not imposed formal liquidity ratios for banks.253
Illiquidity, however, can damage the credibility of a bank severely. It
is technical insolvency brought about by a bank's inability to meet cur-
rent commitments.- It has been suggested that liquidity is more im-
portant than a high capital ratio 5 and that a bank can operate safely
with no capital as long as it remains profitable- 56 Liquidity is also a
primary concern in determining systemic risk. One theory postulates
the cause of the Great Depression was a liquidity crisis brought about
by the Federal Reserve Board's reducing the money supply.-51
245. See id.
246. See Donald Simonson, Vendor Financing Business Bypasses Banks, U.S.
Banker, May 1994, at 86.
247. Ik
248. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
249. See Alisa J. Freundlich, Opportunities for Lenders: How the New Banking
Legislation Will Affect Commercial Real Estate Lending, 77 J. Com. Lending 9 (Nov.
1994).
250. See id.
251. 59 Fed. Reg. 27,116 (1994) (proposed May 25, 1994) (announcing OCC, Fed,
and FDIC proposed rules on recourse and direct credit substitutes and market risk).
252. See iUi
253. While regulations often mention liquidity as a factor taken into account in the
overall assessment of a bank, there are no quantitative measures similar to those for
capital.
254. See Finnerty, supra note 99, at 172.
255. See Clark, supra note 139, at 56.
256. See Taylor supra note 2, at 90.
257. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 448 n.1 (4th ed. 1992).
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Federal regulators have acknowledged that liquidity risk is difficult
to measure and that CAGs are not an adequate means of ensuring
liquidity.258 CAGs encourage liquidity by allowing banks to hold ex-
tremely liquid assets free of capital requirements.259 Nonetheless,
capital requirements are generally not employed to maintain liquidity,
but to "prevent[ ] ... bottom line insolvency. 2 60
The indeterminacy of liquidity arises from the difficulty in deter-
mining depositors' withdrawal rate. Commercial banks have a legal
obligation to pay depositors who request withdrawals, and withdraw-
als are typically not uniform. Banks must accurately predict the im-
pact of deposit shocks if depositors request an extraordinarily large
number of withdrawals on a given day.261 The amount of funds the
banks dedicate to withdrawals are only a small portion of total assets
they hold. A lack of liquidity harms not just the individual bank, but
the entire banking system as lack of confidence in one institution
breeds lack of confidence in others.
CAGs do not make it easier for banks to remain liquid. Banks must
find the correct liquidity ratio to maintain both liquidity and profit-
ability. The more liquid an asset, the less profitable the asset, and
when profitability decreases, the liquidity of a bank must increase in
order to compensate.262 Thus, preventing illiquidity and bottom line
insolvency, the two ways a bank can fail,263 are at odds with each
other.
5. Enforcement and Compliance Costs
There is no doubt that regulation, and in particular CAGs, have
costs and dangers, and the costs can be high.26 The price for regula-
tion is paid, initially on both sides of the regulatory fence. Enforce-
ment costs include the budgets of federal regulators. Compliance
costs include the routine and elaborate reporting demanded by regula-
tors that must be carried out by bank personnel. The cost of regula-
tors is paid directly by taxpayers, the cost to the banks is ultimately
passed on to bank customers, bank employees, and shareholders. 6 s
The larger potential cost is in decreased lending capacity. This means
258. E.g., Statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of Currency, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, on supervision of banks' derivatives activities, Washington, D.C., May
25, 1994, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency QJ., Sept. 1994, at 67.
259. See Fmnerty, supra note 99, at 172.
260. See Clarke, supra note 139, at 68.
261. Id at 55.
262. See Fimnerty, supra note 99, at 260.
263. Gowland, supra note 2, at 77-78 n.11.
264. See id. at 24.
265. "A 1992 study by the American Bankers Association estimated compliance
costs at $10.7 billion or 59% of the industry's profits." Danforth, supra note 45, at 2.
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lower profits and a higher percentage of bank failures.' FDICIA has
been singled out as increasing compliance costs substantially, in par-
ticular the cost of incorporating interest rate risk and concentration
risk into the CAGs. 67
Costs are not limited merely to the funds needed to create, super-
vise, and examine banks. The effect of the CAGs on bank activities
also imposes costs on market participants whose loans fall within the
higher risk categories requiring the most capital. There has been a
marked shift in the balance sheet of banks. Between the first quarter
of 1989 when risk-based capital standards were formally adopted and
the fourth quarter of 1992, mortgage loans have increased by twenty
seven percent and United States government securities have increased
by seventy percent- 68 Meanwhile, nonmortgage loans of United
States commercial banks have fallen by three percent.- 9
High costs may be justified if they are necessary to maintain a
healthy system of financial intermediaries. The current CAGs, how-
ever, do not merit this justification. Risk weighting in certain in-
stances does not adequately reflect the interests of a safe and sound
banking systems. It reflects other public policy goals. The fifty per-
cent risk weighting of first mortgages for one to four family houses is
an example of regulators giving banks incentives to loan money for
first time home buyers. Depending on many factors such as market
conditions, the buyer's credit, and interests rates, this policy may un-
dermine bank stability. Most regulation produces a safer banking sys-
tem; however it reduces the efficiency of the market enormously.
Because of the constraints placed on banks, fewer transactions are
completed, except perhaps in the arenas that the regulators favor,
such as housing.270 Government credit rationing violates the free




CAGs have forced banks to shift the assets they hold in their portfo-
lios. In the early 1990s banks reduced their commercial loans and
raised their treasury holdings.2 This resulted in a corresponding de-
crease in the number of borrowers who were able to obtain loans.'





270. See Gowland, supra note 2, at 24, 39.
271. Butler & Dugan, supra note 1, at 873.
272. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Did Risk-based Capital Allocate Bank
Credit and Cause a "Credit Crunch" in the United States, 26 J. of Money, Credit &




because they have the option of issuing commercial paper.2 74 Rather,
consumers and small businesses, that portion of the economy that rep-
resents half the gross domestic product and constitutes the principal
source of job creation, suffer.2 75 Congress recognized the reliance of
small businesses on bank lending and the importance of small busi-
nesses to the economy.276 Congress has also acknowledged that the
regulatory environment has caused banks to reduce significantly lend-
ing to commercial and industrial enterprises.277 Congress recom-
mended, however, that the regulators encourage banks to hold even
more capital so that banks would be able to make commercial loans
and would be protected from downturns in the economy.2 78 Requir-
ing banks to hold more capital regardless of the assets they hold
defeats the purpose of the risk weight categories. It is a retreat to
simple capital-to-assets ratio. Furthermore, the credit crunch indi-
cates that holding excess capital is too costly for banks. Forcing banks
to hold a larger percentage of less profitable loans will increase the
negative effects of the CAGs already discussed. The imposition of ex-
cess capital will only prolong a situation where banks are not willing
to lend because the penalties imposed by the CAGs outweigh the ben-
efits of higher yields.279
6. The Imprecision of the Risk Weight Categories
The risk weight categories define four levels of risk.280 The diffi-
culty with these categories is that they are very complex, yet not pre-
cise enough to reflect substantial variance in the risk of the most
important assets banks hold, those in the one hundred percent cate-
gory. These "high risk" loans provide financing to the private sector,
to large corporations and small businesses.2 '1 The CAGs make no at-
tempt to differentiate between a loan to a blue chip company and a
loan to a company in extreme financial difficulty.2s At the same time,
the regulations subsidize municipalities with poor credit ratings, which
regardless of their financial condition, still fall into a twenty percent
risk weight category.2s3 Furthermore, CAGs make no attempt to take
collateral into account in business loans. Because there are no incen-
tives for banks to hold less capital for safer loans, the CAGs give
274. Richard C. Breeden & William M. Isaac, Thank Basel for Credit Crunch, Wall
St. J., Nov. 4, 1992, at A14.
275. Id
276. H.R. Rep. No. 410, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 19 (1993).
277. Id
278. Id at 38.
279. See Stuart D. Root, Bank Capital, Asset Liquidation, and the Credit Crunch,
1993 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 169, 187 (1993).
280. See discussion supra part I.B.
281. See H.R. Rep. No. 410, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 38 (1993) (discussing CAGs'
negative impact on commercial and industrial lending).
282. See Afford, supra note 159, at 216.
283. Gordon, supra note 2, at 509-10.
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banks an unfortunate incentive. To maintain earnings, banks must
securitize or shed expensive, high risk assets. Yet, those high risk as-
sets that are held must be profitable, and therefore risky enough to
make them worth holding.'
CAGs do not take into account the tremendous effect management
can have on the assets within each categoryass Risk may vary de-
pending on "underwriting standards, documentation, and review and
collection procedures. ' '21 6 CAGs neither take account of poor man-
agement, nor account for management fraud, a cause of many bank
failures.
Two other inadequacies of CAGs should be mentioned. The first is
that CAGs do not measure the market value of assets or capital, but
rely on the book value or the cost of the assets.287 Depending on the
economic environment, or a host of other variables, bank assets can
change drastically in value, leading to insolvency. CAGs would not
respond to such a change in value. The second is that they measure
the risk of individual assets risk rather than the portfolio risk of all the
assets a bank may hold.' Basic portfolio theory dictates that regula-
tors should look at the overall return and variance of a bank's portfo-
lio rather than the individual assets a bank selects.' CAGs,
therefore, do not encourage banks to diversify their portfolios to re-
duce the risk of the most commonly held assets: commercial and per-
sonal loans. If CAGs took account of portfolio diversification, banks
284. Statistical studies on this point conflict, but an article published by the Comp-
troller of Currency concludes that the CAGs had no impact on the portfolio risk of
capital constrained banks. Jacques & Nigro, supra note 20, at 3.
285. See Bruce W. Morgan, Risk Capital Standards Do Not Reflect Either Real
Risks or Real Capital, Am. Banker, Mar. 15, 1994, at 18.
286. Id "Thus, some real estate loans may entail substantially more risk than many
business or consumer loans that require more capital." Id
287. Regulators proposed rules that would make banks value certain securities at
market value when calculating their inclusion in capital. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,328
(1994). Regulators have decided to drop this rule, known as F.A.S. 115 (for State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115) because, according to Eugene A.
Ludwig, the Comptroller of Currency, "'Requiring banks to use FAS 115 to calculate
risk-based capital would have subjected some banks to wide swings in their risk-based
capital ratios with no real public benefit.'" Robyn Meredith, Regulators Decide to
Scrap Controversial Capital Plan, Am. Banker, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1, 2 (citation omitted).
288. Many reasons have been presented for th[e] lack of rigor in the bank
portfolio management process, especially when compared to the sophistica-
tion of capital market investors.
A major reason has been the lack of readily available tools for estimating
and projecting credit losses and the related volatility for loan cohorts that
have common characteristics or dependencies.
Banks that can demonstrate that their credit loss volatility is both under-
standable and controllable should be able to justify for lower capital require-
ments which, in turn, may set the stage for the survival and growth of the
institution.
Abraham, supra note 193, at 26.
289. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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would be able to reduce their capital requirements by offsetting the
risks associated with classes of loans that respond in opposite ways to
the same external event. By failing to take account of this type of risk
management, CAGs do not help banks perform their core function of
making loans. Instead, they hinder it.
Regulators have fashioned guidelines sophisticated enough to re-
duce systemic risk and protect the Bank Insurance Fund.290 For
banks, the CAGs are complex enough to be costly, yet they are not
sufficiently precise to measure risk accurately. 291 The result is that
CAGs encumber banks without providing proper incentives, such as
the incentive to diversify their portfolios and manage risk more
carefully.
CAGs do not encompass many of the risks to which banks are sub-ject. These risks include interest rate risk, foreign currency risk, li-
quidity risk, inflation risk, market risk, position risk, legal risk, fraud
risk, and poor management risk.292 The formulators of the current
CAGs concentrated almost exclusively on credit risk when determin-
ing the risk weight categories for bank assets.2 93 Under FDICIA,
however, regulators have been instructed to incorporate interest rate
risk, concentration of credit risk and the risk of nontraditional activi-
ties into the CAGs.294 These proposed rules will be discussed further
in part III.
III. THE FUTURE ROLE OF REGULATORY CAPITAL
Banks have responded well to the current economic climate in spite
of the difficult, though improving, market environment they face.
Proposed amendments to the CAGs, however, still threaten increased
regulatory control over bank assets. While Congress and the regula-
tors consider allowing banks to participate in investment banking ac-
290. A primary purpose of FDICIA was to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund.
FDICIA, supra note 38, § 101. However a common complaint regarding FDICIA is
that it did not include the broad reforms of the banking system sought by the Treasury
Department and the banking industry. See Sarah J. Hughes, Banking and Deposit
Insurance: An Unfinished Agenda for the 1990s, 68 Ind. LJ. 835, 835 (1993).
291. Despite their superficial complexity, none of the existing risk-based capi-
tal regimes goes much beyond the most simplistic systems of risk classifica-
tion. Given the great expense that such a regime would impose on
institutions to comply with these risk-based rules and on regulators to moni-
tor compliance, it is not obvious that the end result would be better than
traditional capital rules.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 593.
292. See BoUenbacher, supra note 120, at 96.
293. See Basle Agreement, supra note 29, at 3312-14.
294. FDICIA, supra note 38, § 305. The regulators have proposed rules to take
account of these risks. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,206 (1993) (proposed Sept. 14, 1993) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208 & 325) (concerning interest rate risk) [hereinafter
Interest Rate Risk Proposal]; 59 Fed. Reg. 84206 (1994) (proposed Feb. 22, 1994)
(announcing uniform rules by FDIC, Fed and OCC to account for concentration of
credit risk and risks of nontraditional activities).
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tivities, a modified role for the CAGs has not yet been formally
discussed; however it is likely that CAGs will continue to play an im-
portant role in bank regulatory policy. Indeed, if Congress continues
to reduce product and market restrictions, capital regulation will inev-
itably increase.
A. The Current Market Environment
The trend of securitization continues to portend the disintermedia-
tion of banks as Wall Street issues more and more securities backed
by traditional bank products.295 While Congress and the regulators
have taken a step forward in breaking down branching restrictions,
they have not responded to entreaties by the banking industry to al-
low banks to underwrite securities, insurance, and mutual funds. Non-
bank financial institutions can engage in bank restricted activities and
enjoy most of the privileges traditionally reserved for banks. Non-
banks are consequently much more efficient intermediaries than
banks. For example, mutual funds can run on one percent of their
managed assets, and Fannie Mae runs on twenty basis points,291 while
banks must operate between three and five percent.297 Banks have
appeared to overcome this disadvantage somewhat during the past
two years, but the recent prosperity of the banking industry is more
likely attributable to the concurrent growth of the economy.
In the second quarter of 1994, national banks earned their highest
profits ever.298 Much to the delight of regulators and bank owners,
this trend of earning record profits has continued for the second year
in a row.29 These record profits may indicate that banks are thriving
because of the regulatory environment. It certainly demonstrates
that, at the very least, they can thrive in spite of it. The Comptroller's
figures also indicate a rapid consolidation among national banks?.3 It
also appears that the largest national banks are thriving while smaller
banks are disappearing.3 1 This continues the trend begun by deregu-
lation over a decade ago; the performance of banks, however, has di-
295. Seymann, supra note 184, at 253.
296. There are 100 basis points in one percent, so one basis point is one one-hun-
dredth of a percent.
297. Seymann, supra note 184, at 253.
298. Operations of National Banks, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency 03., Sept.
1994, at 1.
299. Operations of National Banks, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency QJ., Mar.
1994, at 1.
300. See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Too Big to Fai4 Too Few to Serve? The Potential
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 957, 1081 (1992) (concluding that consoli-
dation is likely to continue toward nationwide banking leading to a riskier, less effi-
cient and less profitable banking system) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail];
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Potential Risks of Nationwide Consolidation in the Bank-
ing Industry: A Reply to Professor Miller, 77 Iowa L Rev. 1133, 1133 (1992).
301. See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 300, at 1040.
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verged significantly, with some doing very well and many others
failing.30 2
Access to information continues to improve and interest rates are
on the rise?0 3 Increased competition and the lower margins caused by
higher interest rates are causing banks to lend more freely and at re-
duced rates to maintain their earnings.3 4 In the event of a reces-
sion,30 5 this freer lending could bring trouble to banks when more
borrowers will have difficulty paying the money back.3 °6 Regulators
have taken note of the easing of credit and are showing concern. 0 7 In
addition, banks are continuing to lose market share to nonbanks. 30 8
These same conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s prompted Con-
gress to reduce regulation so banks could keep up with nonbank com-
petitors who had access to information and the ability to emulate
banking functions without a banking charter at prices below those
banks could offer.3 0 9 Because of the recent good times enjoyed by
banks, however, regulatory policy, reactionary by nature, maintains its
course.
B. Recent Proposed Rules
Recently, regulators announced significant additions to the CAGs.
For example, regulators implemented final rules that take account of
bilateral netting requirements, 310 concentration risk,311 and nontradi-
302. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
303. Bloomberg Business News, Stock Prices Fall on Interest Rate Worries, N.Y.
Tmes, Nov. 18, 1994, at D8.
304. Janet L. Fix, Debt Crisis Looming? Bankers Play Risky Game of Lending,
USA Today, Dec. 28, 1994, at B1.
305. The current expansion is nearly four years old, and the United States has not
gone even nine years without a recession in the post-World War II era. David Wessel,
Creative Accounting? U.S. Balanced-Budget Law May Prove Unenforceable, Asian
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 1995, at 6; see Does a Flattening Yield Curve Mean a
Slowdown is Coming?, Investors Bus. Daily, Dec. 13, 1994, at Bi; Economists Fore-
cast U.S. Economy to Slow Down in '95, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 12, 1994, at
4.
306. Id.
307. See Are Banks, Again in the Pink, too Eager to Lend?, Investor's Bus. Daily,
Dec. 7, 1994, at A4; Alan Greenspan, chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Address Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate, (July 20, 1994), in 80 Fed. Reserve Bull. 793, 796 (1994).
308. "Commercial banks have ceded market share to nonbanks in credit cards,
mortgages, and commercial paper. The industry also stands to lose a big chunk of the
small-business lending market if legislation pending in Congress passes." Barbara A.
Rehm, Business Loans are Rising Again, and Banks Hear Rivals' Footsteps; Washing-
ton Wrestles with New Entrants, Am. Banker, June 23, 1994, at 3.
309. See Barth et al., supra note 1, at 61-62.
310. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,645 (announcing OCC and OTS final rule of Dec. 28, 1994
recognizing risk reducing benefits of certain bilateral netting contracts (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 567); 59 Fed. Reg. 62987 (announcing Fed's fihal rule of Dec. 7,
1994 recognizing bilateral netting contracts) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208 &
225); 59 Fed. Reg. 66656 (FDIC's final rule of Dec. 28, 1994 recognizing bilateral
netting contracts) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325).
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tional activity risk.312 Derivatives pose the newest challenge.313 Con-
gress and the regulators have just begun a dialogue on how best to
account for the risk imposed and prevented by these instruments. The
proposed rules that account for interest rate risk present the most im-
minent and menacing addition to CAG regulations.
Interest rate risk ("IRR") is a serious problem for banks. Regula-
tors plan to raise CAGs to account for a high interest rate exposure.314
Banks are exposed to interest risk because they normally hold long
term debt at low interest rates against shorter term deposits. 31 5 Be-
cause banks often loan at fixed interest rates and hold long term se-
curities, fluctuations in interest rates can affect a bank's position
substantially. Banks must carefully estimate factors such as the rate of
inflation to maintain profitability. Risks are often interdependent.
Fluctuation in the rate of inflation affects both IRR and credit risk. If
money devalues faster than expected this devalues the assets of
banks.316 It also means wages are not keeping up with the cost of
living which, in turn, reduces the credit worthiness of borrowers lead-
ing to an increase in loan defaults.317 When inflation is slower than a
bank estimates, the market value of that bank's loans will decrease
because the value of cash flow will not equal the bank's projections.31 8
Because CAGs induce banks to hold long term, fixed rate government
securities, CAGs contribute to the interest rate exposure of banks.319
The regulators have attempted to address IRR32° under their man-
date from Congress to do so.32 ' Currently, CAG calculations only ac-
count for the credit exposure of IRR contracts, not the interest rate
311. 59 Fed. Reg. 64,561 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R1 pts. 3, 208, 325 & 567)
(concerning concentration of credit risk and risk of nontraditional activities).
312. J&
313. Derivatives are contracts that derive their value from underlying forward and
option contracts. See Kenneth Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 91, 99. Congress and the regulators are currently trying
to formulate guidelines to ensure adequate risk management policies that incorpo-
rated risk limits, involve senior management in risk management, and ensure ade-
quate internal controls. Fed Risk Guidelines for End-Users of Derivatives Due Soon,
Phillips Says, BNA Banking Daily, Mar. 20, 1995. Congress is considering enacting a
number of bills including the Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Act of
1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would provide a framework for
risk management at financial institutions and would create a new regulator by estab-
lishing the Federal Derivatives Commission. Id
314. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.10(d) (1994).
315. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 90.
316. Kaufman, supra note 134, at 607.
317. Id
318. Id.
319. See Breeden, supra note 274, at A14.
320. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,206 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208 & 325)
(proposed Sept. 14, 1993).
321. FDICIA, supra note 38, § 305.
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exposure.322 Interest rate contracts are treated as off-balance expo-
sures that must be converted to on-balance sheet items. 3 The risk
weight category to which an asset is assigned is limited to a fifty per-
cent capital requirement. 32 Currently, the conversion factor for IRR
contracts depends on whether the asset has a maturity of one year or
less or greater than one year.3 s If the maturity is less than one year,
the conversion factor is zero percent,326 and therefore capital must be
held only against the replacement cost of the contract. If the exposure
is greater than one year, the conversion factor is 0.5%.327 Though
long overdue, the regulators have not yet promulgated a final rule on
IRR.3 8
The regulators responded to FDICIA's mandate to incorporate
IRR with proposed rules in the summer of 1992.329 In the summer of
1993, the banking regulators responded to criticisms and comments by
banks,330 by issuing the most recently proposed rules on IRR with
"major changes."'331 The formulation of these rules has been pro-
tracted; an acceptable model has proven elusive. Even four years af-
ter the statutory mandate, there is evidence the proposed regulations
will be offered once again for public comment.332
The current proposed rules measure IRR by placing a banks' assets,
liabilities, and off-balance sheet items into "time bands ' 33 3 based on
their maturities.334 They are then multiplied by an appropriate risk
322. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(5) (1994) (regulating interest rate and
exchange rate contracts).
323. See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a description of the conversion
factors.
324. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(5)(iii) (1994).
325. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(5) (1994).
326. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(5)(ii)(A)(I) (1994).
327. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(5)(ii)(A)(II) (1994).
328. However, the Office of Thrift Supervision is an exception. Regulatory Capital:
Interest Rate Risk Component, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,799 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
563 and 567).
329. Regulators responded to FDICIA's mandate to incorporate IRR with pro-
posed rules in the summer of 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 35,507, 35,508 (1992).
330. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,206, 48,207 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208 & 325).
Critics noted that the proposed rules were not flexible enough, that they were impre-
cise, and that they were too complex and burdensome. Id. Many banks thought t cir
in house risk measurement was superior to that of the agencies and that forcing banks
to make decisions based on a less accurate model would prove deleterious. Id.
331. Id These changes include exempting low-risk banks from IRR reporting re-
quirements and allowing banks to rely on their internal risk measurement systems
when approved by regulators. Id.
332. See Banking Agencies May Release Revised Rate Risk Plan, FDIC Official
Says, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 693 (Nov. 14, 1994).
333. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,206, 48,214 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, &
325). The proposed time bands are (1) up to 3 months, (2) 3 to 12 months, (3) 1 to 3
years, (4) 3 to 5 years, (5) 5 to 10 years, (6) 10 to 20 years, and (7) greater than 20
years. Id.
334. Id at 48,208.
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weight and those risk-weighted positions335 are added to produce a
net risk weight position.336 The IRR formula has many of the quali-
ties of CAGs-it is not precise enough to be useful to banks and too
complex not to be burdensome. For example, to simplify the calcula-
tion risk, weights are based on hypothetical instruments.337 With the
numerous and varied instruments available to manage rate risk, these
hypotheticals cannot be sufficiently precise.3 s If the regulators deter-
mine that the bank's own risk measurement model is more accurate,
the bank may avoid risk weights based on hypothetical instruments.339
Working so closely with banks in developing an LRR measurement
tool, regulators come very close to managing the banks themselves.310
Regulators continually disavow a policy that would lead to micro man-
aging banks, however, the methodology used to implement interest
rate risk is ongoing and intrusive.
In addition to accounting for risk inherent in a cyclical economy,
regulators must respond to the innovative ways that banks can risk
assets without having to provide a capital cushion. Derivatives34
have posed new problems and forced regulators to account for the
wide variety of risk to which they are subject.3 2 Regulators have re-
sponded with regulations that account for the credit risk of deriva-
tives,343 but have acknowledged that the wide variety of risks
335. There would be four main categories of risk weights, each divided into seven
parts. The four categories refer to the types of assets that would be included. They
are (1) Adjustable rate mortgages and securities, (2) Fixed rate mortgages, asset-
backed securities, fixed rate mortgages, consumer loans, etc. (3) zero or low coupon
securities, and (4) high-risk mortgage securities. It at 48214.
336. See iL
337. See id.
338. The regulators are aware of this imprecision. See id. Their answer is to allow
banks to use their own measurement model. Id
339. 'To make this determination, examiners would consider the types of instru-
ments held or offered by the bank, the integrity of the data, and whether the assump-
tions and relationships underlying the model are reasonable." Id at 48.208.
340. At a minimum, examiners would identify the components of an internal
model that incorporate assumptions or calculations that differ significantly
from those used in the supervisory model, assess the importance of these
differences, and then determine whether a bank has a sufficient basis for its
treatment. Examiners would also monitor changes to an institution's as-
sumptions or calculation procedures over time in order to assure the on-
going integrity of the measure.
Id
341. Derivatives are financial contracts whose value depends on underlying assets.
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
342. These risks include "counterparty credit risk, market risk, settlement risk, op-
erating risk, market liquidity risk, legal risk, and aggregate or interconnection risk."
Daniel M. Trieff, Developments in Banking Law: 1993,13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 90,
98 (1994).
343. See, eg., 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A, tbL 3 (1994) (summarizing the method of
calculating the credit equivalents of interest rate and exchange rate contracts).
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associated with derivatives cannot be quantifiably measured and ac-
counted for in the CAGs. 344
C. The Future of Regulation and Deregulation
Regulators maintain that deregulation will continue to make banks
more competitive345 and that regulation will continue to evolve and
change as banking evolves and changes.346 This implies that pruden-
tial regulation will increase as deregulation enhances banks' powers
to compete. 7 Thus, despite the difficulties with CAGs, they will re-
main a strong part of effectuating regulatory policy. While there are
indications that regulators consider the emphasis on the role of CAGs
to be too great,348 the presumption that they are responsible for the
recapitalization of the Bank Insurance Fund and improved bank earn-
ings indicates that CAGs will continue to play a primary role in ensur-
ing bank safety.349 Moreover, the recent efforts of the Basle
Committee and Federal regulators to take account of more types of
risk 350 demonstrate their strong commitment to CAGs as the regula-
344. See Statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of Currency, Before the Sub-
committee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, on supervision of banks' derivatives activities, Washington, D. C., May
25, 1994, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency Q.J., Sept. 1994, at 67.
345. Remarks by Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of Currency, before the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, on bank
supervision, Chicago, Illinois, May 12, 1994, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency Q.J.,
Sept. 1994, at 63.
346. Id.
347. See id.
348. Greenspan, supra note 307, at 797.
349. The Comptroller of Currency advocates more vigilant supervision with a
hands on approach. He stresses that supervisors "must concentrate their attention
and their resources on the risks with greatest potential implication for the economy
and the Bank Insurance Fund... To date, the approach of banks supervisors to these
risks has been primarily ad hoc and crisis driven. That needs to change." Remarks by
Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of Currency, before the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, on bank supervision, Chicago,
Illinois, May 12, 1994, Off. of the Comptroller of Currency QJ., Sept. 1994, at 63.
350. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,206 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208 & 325) (concern-
ing OCC, Fed, and FDIC proposed rules addressing interest rate risk); 59 Fed. Reg.
10,946 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (proposed Mar. 9, 1994) (concerning
OCC's inclusion of qualifying multifamily properties in the 50% weight category); 59
Fed. Reg. 26,456 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3,208 & 225) (proposed May
20, 1994) (concerning bilateral netting requirements); 59 Fed. Reg. 27,116 (1994) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325 & 567) (proposed May 25, 1994) (con-
cerning OCC, Fed, and FDIC proposed rules addressing recourse and direct credit
substitutes and market risk); 59 Fed. Reg. 43,508 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 208 & 225) (proposed Aug. 24, 1994) (announcing Fed's rules concerning calcula-
tion of credit equivalent amounts of off-balance sheet contracts); 59 Fed. Reg. 45,243
(1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (proposed Sept. 1, 1994) (concerning OCC
rules addressing calculation of credit equivalent amounts of off-balance sheet con-
tracts); 59 Fed. Reg. 64,561 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 325 & 567)
(concerning concentration of credit risk and risk of nontraditional activities); 59 Fed.
Reg. 66,662 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325) (Dec. 28, 1994) (concerning
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tory policy of the future. The lofty goals regulators have for capital
requirements also reveals their commitment to them: "[B]anks must
hold sufficient capital to make the deposit insurance guaranty
moot.,
351
D. Shifting to Risk Management as an Alternative to CAGs
Leading financial companies have overhauled their risk manage-
ment programs and have adopted a new attitude toward managing
risk that expands the responsibility of risk from internal auditors to
everyone from the "CEO on down."'3 51 "Control is effective... only
when managers become convinced that it is part of doing business, not
separate from it .... 'The guys making the money can't relegate con-
trol to someone else. They've got to take responsibility for it them-
selves.' ,31 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, praised the creation of chief risk management officers in finan-
cial firms.3 4 He noted that banks are behind the private sector in risk
management. "[L]oss covariances across the bankwide portfolio of all
risk position are still in their infancy. '35 5 The Chairman called for a
shift in individual bank evaluations toward the bank's overall risk po-
sition.356 Together with his position that it is not efficient to refine
CAGs further,3 7 this acknowledges that CAGs, while a useful tool to
recapitalize banks reeling from problems acquired in the 1980s, should
be de-emphasized as a policy to ensure safety and soundness in a
changing financial environment.
[T]he temptation seems great to make regulatory capital rules ever
more complex and as complicated as the ever increasing array of
credit and credit-substitute products. But if we start down the road
of varying capital requirements by fine risk gradations, where will it
end? Greatly increasing the complexity of capital regulations can
only lead to inefficiency. No matter how complex capital require-
ments might become, we can be confident that new products would
be developed that would seek to exploit the remaining inevitable
distortions in the capital regulations.
This is not just a problem with CAGs, it is a problem inherent in regu-
lation: it is reactive and does not anticipate the problems even that
regulation itself causes.
FDIC's decision not to include unrealized gains or losses in Tier 1 capital after much
outcry from the banking industry).
351. Greenspan, supra note 239, at 47.
352. Phillip L. Zweig et al., Managing Risk, Businessweek, OCL 31, 1994, at 86, 88.
353. 1d (quoting William C. Jennings, internal control consulting partner at
Coopers & Lybrand).
354. Greenspan, supra note 239, at 46-47.
355. Id. at 47.
356. Id.
357. Id.




When regulators interfere with the market by creating adequacy
guidelines, they do not necessarily ensure the stability of individual
banks. Market conditions and management are the principal factors
other than credit risk that determine bank stability. These factors are
much more likely to interfere with a bank's ability to thrive. Regula-
tors do provide systemic stability by giving banks time to merge with
other, more skillfully run banks, thereby mitigating loss of public con-
fidence in the banking system. The increased overhead of the CAGs,
however, will make it more difficult for individual banks to survive as
the economy recedes. CAGs will only work efficiently if they are
taken to their logical extent-having the regulators run the banks.
The benefits that free enterprise produces, in efficiency and innova-
tion, advise against such a drastic measure. The need for strong public
confidence, however, precludes reliance solely on market forces to
discipline banks.
The debate over how much regulation is good for private enterprise
is especially germane in today's economic and political environment,
but this debate, in various forms, has continued since the founding. In
1791, Hamilton and Jefferson argued over whether the federal govern-
ment had the power to create a central bank and the harms and bene-
fits such power might engender.3 59
In the case of CAGs, it is time again for the regulatory current to
ebb. The current entrenchment of CAGs in regulatory policy reveals
the inadequacies of banking regulation. Regulators will continue to
enforce and refine capital standards as the principal method of main-
taining a safe and stable banking system. In light of the regulators'
predilection for capital standards and Congress' reluctance to address
the competitive inequality banks face, the future of banking does not
look bright. CAGs are certainly not the answer to the regulatory and
market challenges United States banks face. The traditional role of
banking is changing rapidly, and the banking system needs major reg-
ulatory reform to ensure the continuing role of banks as in-
termediaries in the economy. Congress has introduced legislation that
would modernize the banking regulation.360 As for CAGs, there are
359. See Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking 11-15 (1992).
360. The Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 18, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), a bill to enhance bank competition, is currently being considered by
Congress. This bill proposes to reform the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by allowing
bank holding companies to engage in investment banking activities. Not suprisingly,
the securities activities would only be allowed if the depository institution is well capi-
talized as defined by section 38(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Id. at§§ 103(b)(2)(a) & (k)(1). Regulators have urged Congress not only to expand bank
activities, but also to remove the regulatory burdens that put banks at a competitive
disadvantage: "If we dismantle the Glass-Steagall wall, we must not leave so much
regulatory barbed wire in its place that we defeat our objectives." Testimony of Eu-
gene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, before the Committee on Banking and
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alternatives to increasing their scope. Leveling the playing field be-
tween banks and nonbank intermediaries would remove much of the
burden of CAGs. Examining such broad scale regulatory reform,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, within the current
regulatory environment, Congress and the regulators must emphasize
finding an optimal, rather than an adequate, level of capital for banks.
Supervised private sector risk management would provide a more effi-
cient means of maintaining bank safety than imposing imprecise blan-
ket capital requirements.
Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 28, 1995, LEXIS Banking
Bulletin, March 8, 1995, at 2.
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